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Abstract
Between 1960 and 1977, Richmond, Virginia, experienced a tremendous racial
shift in its overall population. The shift from majority white to majority black brought about
the city’s first black majority city council, black mayor, and majority black school district
with a black superintendent. How and why this racial transition happened is the focus of
this work. Richmond’s racial transition was a part of Civil Rights legislation destabilizing
the sociopolitical landscape. As federal Civil Rights legislation was intended to create a
post-racial America, in Richmond, blacks and whites ensured the opposite. Both races
combined class interest, past racial norms, and future racial aspirations to recreate a
Richmond that suited their interest. This complicated political, racial, and class-centered
drama broke a perceived racial solidarity and created interracial political agents that would
have never existed under Jim Crow. For example, working-class whites and blacks
politically aligned against their racial elite’s efforts to desegregate public school and annex
suburban counties. Likewise, the same middle-class black elite who politically opposed
affluent whites in the early 1960s supported affluent white desegregation and annexation
efforts. In all, Richmond’s urban crisis was a story encompassing how politics, race, class,
and space cosmically shifted the racial dynamics of the former Confederate capital. As
Richmond looked drastically different in 1977 than in 1960, Civil Rights Era racial,
political, educational, and spatial changes best explain Richmond’s racial transition.
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Introduction
On the eve of the Civil Rights Movement, Richmond’s white elite dominated the
city council while maintaining segregated public schools. Yet, by 1977, the once capital of
the Confederacy, became had a black majority city council, black mayor, and integrated
public school system. This racial shift in the city’s power structure was the culmination of
several events that destabilized the urban political arena. Through urban elections, school
desegregation, and annexation, Richmond transitioned out of Jim Crow Era and into the
Civil Rights Era. As Jim Crow laws were removed by Civil Rights legislation, urban blacks
exercised their political power through urban elections and school desegregation. While
blacks garnered municipal control, through internal class conflict, middle-class whites fled
Richmond for the neighboring suburbs of Chesterfield and Henrico. Black political gains
and white flight slowly removed white elites from municipal power. So, affluent whites
combatted urban blacks and suburban whites with annexation, hoping to maintain their
political control over Richmond. While race appeared to be the cause of Richmond’s urban
crisis, it was because of various political agendas that class centered racial groups all vied
for political power during the Civil Rights Era.
In this thesis, I explore how the Civil Rights Era did not inspire a post-racial
Richmond; rather, Civil Rights legislation, annexation, school desegregation, and
destabilized urban politics and caused Richmond’s political power to shift from affluent
whites to black professionals. Before 1960, Richmond was a majority white segregated
city. Residentially, whites dominated three of the city’s four corridors: Northside,
Southside, and West End. Blacks primarily lived in the city’s core and East End. Jim Crow
Era white elites used their racial majority to control the channels of municipal power by
creating white privilege while simultaneously disenfranchising black political and
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educational development. After the removal of Jim Crow laws, various white and black
political groups vied for control of the city. After 1960, the apparent white-black dichotomy
diversified into four major groups, all looking to recreate Richmond in their own image.
Civil Rights Era Richmond was unique because it allowed self-serving class-centered
groups to make alliances, sometimes across racial lines, to control the city that Civil Rights
created in the Confederate capital.
There were two racial divides and four social classes that sought to control Civil
Rights Era Richmond. Richmond’s two biggest racial castes were whites and blacks.
Although mixed-race people, Jews, and Asians lived within the city, this is a story about
the sociopolitical conflict between Richmond’s largest racial groups. Therefore, the blackwhite dichotomy resonates throughout my analysis. As for social classes, each race had
upper-class, middle-class, and working-class poor. The class monoliths I use for white
Richmonders are the wealthy and middle-class. Although poor whites were politically
active, they were not as instrumental in white efforts to deter black political gains. The
black professional class and working class politically defined black Richmond. Despite
being labeled middle-class, black professionals were their race’s elite. Therefore, terms
like black middle-class or middle class blacks refers to Richmond’s black elite.
Primary sources opened my analysis to the nuances of Civil Rights Richmond. My
two primary source categories were the “official” and the “unofficial” record. Official
records, which consisted of newspapers, official correspondences, and federal court cases,
retold the story from an archival perspective. Racial breakdowns in archival sources,
through the repeated use of words like Negro and white, led me to believe that race
dominated the story. Although race rose to the surface of the official record, the events, as
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well as the ways they unfolded with strange interracial political alliances, convinced me
that the former Confederate capital’s Civil Rights history could not be explained
exclusively in terms of racially motivated white economic, political, and residential flight.
The unofficial record addressed my suspicions about the complexity surrounding
Civil Rights Era Richmond. The unofficial record consisted of multiple face-to-face
conversations with black and white Richmonders who declined to be formally interviewed,
as well as seven oral histories. The interviewees, either lived in Richmond during the
seventeen years that framed this study, or knew important figures intimately enough to
provide context for their past actions. Not one interviewee adhered to the monolithic
concept of black and white. Instead, they referred to class differences between the races by
where they lived within the city. After cross examining personal letters from citizens and
city officials with my oral histories, it became clear that race was the outward appearance
of what was a class-centered racial conflict between different factions vying for political
control of a destabilized Richmond. Overall, the primary sources introduced how
seemingly simplified racial conflicts were complicated political struggles for supremacy
during the death of Jim Crow.
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Four secondary works examined Civil Rights Era Richmond. Robert Pratt’s The
Color of Their Skin: Education and Race in Richmond, Virginia, 1954-89 racially
examined Richmond after the Brown decision. It was Richmond’s Jim Crow society,
according to Pratt, that brought about “a shameful legacy” of token school integration in
1960 and re-segregation by 1977. Christopher Silver and John V. Moeser’s The Separate
City: Black Communities in the Urban South, 1940-1968 discussed how white elites used
Jim Crow laws to create racial segregation that was physically, politically, and socially
evident. It was this almost 100-year tradition of physical, economic, and politically racial
separation that created a Civil Rights Era racial battle over municipal power. Christopher
Silver’s Twentieth-Century Richmond: Planning Politics’ and Race used spatial analysis
to uncover Richmond’s long history of structural racism. Urban planning was nothing short
of elite white attempts to maintain control over Richmond’s changing racial dynamics by
limiting black residential and economic mobility. John V. Moeser and Rutledge M.
Dennis’s The Politics of Annexation: Oligarchic Power in a Southern City analyzed how
Richmond’s annexation drama exposed how race and space became ground zero for urban
and suburban white political conflict. Through state and federal intervention, urban and
suburban whites brokered a land deal that suited both interests. Although these four works
defined Civil Rights Era Richmond as a racial conflict, my thesis will explain why race
alone limits the understanding of this era. Although whites and blacks had racial division,
class interest and political uncertainty combined with race to define Civil Rights Era
Richmond by its revolutionary shift from majority white to majority black.1

1

Robert A. Pratt, The Color Of Their Skin: Education And Race In Richmond, Virginia, 1954-89
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), 5-15; Christopher Silver and John V. Moeser, The
Separate City: Black Communities In The Urban South, 1940-1968 (Lexington, Ky: University Press of
Kentucky, 1995), 32; John V. Moeser and Rutledge M. Dennis, The Politics Of Annexation: Oligarchic
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My thesis examines Richmond through a lens each of the four secondary works did
not. While Pratt, Silver, Dennis, and Moeser separated school desegregation, councilmanic
politics, and annexation, I combine the three to cultivate a better understanding of Civil
Rights Era Richmond. One cannot fully assess the revolutionary impact of Civil Rights Era
Richmond without studying school desegregation, urban politics, and annexation together.
Each of the three issues intimately connected in ways that were not understood by Pratt,
Silver, Dennis, and Moeser. The racial migration, political discourse, and social conflict
that defined Civil Rights Era Richmond were caused by the complex social climate school
desegregation, urban politics, and annexation created simultaneously. Separating the three
categories hides the nuanced sociopolitical tension Richmond residents and power brokers
engaged in between 1960 and 1977. Furthermore, this thesis is but a step into using these
three categories to understand how the former Confederate capital experienced its first ever
municipal power shift from white to black in just seventeen years.
Post-World War II urban crises have been linked to economic decline, racist
agendas, and suburban class consciousness. Civil Rights Richmond fits within post-World
War II urban historiography, more specifically, the distinctiveness of the non-northern
urban centers. The three most influential works dealing with post-World War II nonnorthern urban centers were done by Robert Self, Kevin Kruse, and Matthew Lassiter. Each
historian used different lenses to examine the complex social realities of postwar America.
Economically, post-war urban racial shifts resulted from deindustrialization and economic
flight to the suburbs. Racially, post-war white flight covertly reinstituted Jim Crow-style
segregation. From a class perspective, post-war society cultivated a new white collar

Power In A Southern City (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1982), 17; and Virginius Dabney,
Richmond: The Story Of A City (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 105.
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middle-class class, who opposed overt racism and radical integrationalist policies.
Nevertheless, all three interpretations uniquely tied class, race, and economics into an
overall understanding of how the suburban-urban dichotomy facilitated post-war urban
race relations.
Robert Self understood post-World War II urban crises as the result of economic
decline. In American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Post-War Oakland, Robert Self
tied the origins of black grassroots politics to industrial flight from inner cities. Many high
salaried middle-class white industrial and white collar workers followed economic flight
to the suburbs. Industrial flight was economically driven, yet it had racist overtones. This
mass migration was known as white flight because of the disproportionate amount of
whites who were able to relocate to the suburbs when blacks were not economically able
to do so. The Federal Housing Authority did not insure private mortgages to many wellqualified blacks, leaving them in poverty-stricken inner-city neighborhoods. Despite the
racist actions of the FHA, Self argued that white flight was the product of homeownership’s
lure on middle-class whites, not a need to re-segregate from urban blacks. Educational and
workplace discrimination created the white middle class, making middle-class suburban
flight appear racially motivated.2
The allocation of resources heightened the racially charged climate between urban
blacks and the newly suburban white middle class. Self identified that black grassroots
politics gained traction when urban tax revenue was redistributed to suburban business
interest. New highways, property tax breaks and suburban land development resulted from
urban blacks having little-to-no influence over the use of public funds. This prevented

2

Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race And The Struggle For Postwar Oakland (Princeton, N.J. Princeton
University Press, 2003).
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blacks from obtaining high-paying municipal jobs and receiving quality public services
such as transportation, welfare, and public schooling.3
Kevin M. Kruse described post-World War II urban crises as the byproduct of racist
whites seeking protection from the Civil Rights movement. Kruse’s White Flight: Atlanta
and the Making of Modern Conservatism illuminated that white flight, consumer rights
platforms, and economic relocation systematically reinstituted Jim Crow Era white
supremacy in Atlanta. White capitalists and city planners put their disdain into action by
using social class, space, and municipal politics to create geographic separation from
liberal minded blacks wishing to use Civil Rights legislation to establish municipal control
over their built environment. Because white Atlantans resisted Civil Rights change, they
challenged federal authority by creating “modern conservatism.” This conservatism
protected their race-centered agendas under the guise of economic rights. These economic
rights allowed whites to separate from integration through financial exclusion. Instead of
integrating public schools, for example, white Atlantans would relocate to newly developed
areas where housing markets prevented most blacks from infiltrating. Since Jim Crow laws
legislated blacks to poverty, modern conservatives reinstituted Jim Crow by setting
financial limitations on newly enfranchised black Atlantans.4
In Kruse’s Atlanta, white racial solidarity was shattered when one social faction
secured enough political currency to avoid federal Civil Rights legislation. The white
working class, who supported Jim Crow Era white supremacy in the workplace, public
schools, and civil society, were betrayed by their elites who used housing markets,

3

Self, American Babylon, 136.
Kevin Michael Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta And The Making Of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press, 2005).
4
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preparatory schools, and zoning ordinances to separate from federal integration policies.
As blacks filled the urban arena, Jim Crow policies and procedures waned, forcing whites
who could not relocate to deal with integration by sharing municipal power and resources
with black residents. Kruse’s political and racial analysis lacked perspective on one of the
most important municipal services white and black Atlantans had to share: public
education. Matthew Lassiter came along three years later and used class to analyze
Atlanta’s racial strife over public education.5
Matthew Lassiter described post-World War II urban crises as class-centered
movements resulting from the deindustrialized economy creating middle-class, white racial
innocence. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South distanced the field
from Kruse’s racial view of the post-war urban South. Rather, Lassiter used school
desegregation to highlight how the white-collar economy created the “silent majority;” or
moderate whites who used suburbia to escape the economic and racial problems of the
inner city. To Lassiter, the silent majority chose the middle ground between black activists
and racist white elites. The middle ground correlated with their position in the emerging
deindustrialized white-collar economy. Middle-class whites were not blue collar workers;
neither were they corporate elites. They were their own separate social class who wished
to keep their economic and social rights at the expense of the blacks that the New Deal
liberalism forgot. White middle-class economic development created a class identity that
required a matching political platform. This economic and identifiably white social class

5

Kruse, White Flight, 8.

9

resisted the radicalism of liberal reformers and staunch racism from conservatives, as both
threatened the stability of the white, middle-class silent majority.6
Middle-class moderates believed in both economic segregation and racial
integration. Although Lassiter alluded to this position being disingenuous, suburban whites
wished to see the end of racial segregation. Instead, they believed economics should have
been the standard to achieve the liberal policies of integration. This position ignored that
structural racism prevented many blacks from ever becoming middle class. Nevertheless,
school desegregation violated the economic protection that they believed was colorblind.
However, moderates disapproved of legalized racial segregation. The overt racism of the
past pushed them to the center, as many suburbanites were New Deal liberals who
disagreed with conservative opposition to liberal economic policies that created middleclass suburbia. Middle-class whites believed economics to be the determining factor in
social policy, not extremism on both sides of the aisle.7
My thesis contributes to post-World War II urban historiography because it
illuminates how both race and class created the urban crisis in Richmond, Virginia. While
economics played a pivotal role in the federal court proceedings that facilitated the urban
crisis, ultimately, race and class conflict dominated the racial shift. Similar to Kruse’s
Atlanta, white oligarchs used space and politics to maintain their Jim Crow-style racial
order over Richmond. Similar to Lassiter’s Charlotte, class consciousness divided
segregation era elites and suburban moderates over how the post-war urban political arena
should operate. However, Richmond’s race and class structures add complexity to Kruse

6

Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics In The Sunbelt South (Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press, 2006).
7
Lassiter, The Silent Majority, 120.
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and Lassiter’s examples because whites and blacks were not united on racial or class
interests. Rather, Richmond had four factions, segregation era white elites, black
professionals, working-class blacks, and suburban whites, all vying to remake the post-Jim
Crow Richmond according to their class interests. Civil Rights legislation forced each side
to make allies with the other race out of convenience, refuting the narrative of urban politics
having stanched racial division.
Chapter 1 focuses on the origins of Richmond’s black political emergence between
1960 and 1966. In just six years, Richmond’s public school system and population shifted
from majority white to majority black, with three black councilmen serving at once. This
shift resulted from two NAACP lawsuits against the Richmond City School Board and the
mobilization of black voters in city council elections. The two school desegregation
lawsuits forced city officials to begin integration in 1960. Political mobilization came from
black professionals engaging working-class blacks into municipal politics. This created
racial solidarity at the polls, as working-class blacks politically empower their professional
leadership. Black voting power increased in stages. Black voters went from controling the
political careers of white politicians to voting segregation-era black elites into office. Injust
four elections, black Richmonders quickly ascended from an underrepresented voting
constituency to one of the most important voting constituencies in city elections.
Chapter 2, the Middle Years (1967-1970), details how white class division, and the
changing nature of black politics, complicated Richmond’s racial transition. By 1967,
young energetic black politican Henry Marsh III used urban redevelopment to remove
segregation era black leadership from power, all while heading black Richmond’s liberal
regime. As black politics reached new heights under Marsh, white politics experienced
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class breakdowns. Urban and suburban whites disagreed on how to deal with black political
advancement. Suburban whites wanted exclusion from Civil Rights Richmond, as they
recreated racial segregation in surrounding counties. Since white flight and black politics
loosened elite white political control, annexation surfaced as a central issue. Urban and
suburban whites clashed because neither side wished to compromise its original position.
Although a land deal was eventually brokered, annexation conflict weakened white racial
solidarity. Disagreements over the minutia, political impact, and aftermath of the 1969
annexation set up two federal Civil Rights cases that captivated the city throughout the
1970s.
Both urban and suburban whites worked to create their differing visions of the
metropolitan area. Councilmen Phil Bagley, James Wheat, and City Manager Alan Kiepper
worked with suburban officials Irvin Horner, Frederick F. Dietsch, and Melvin Burnet to
broker an annexation that served both parties’ interests. The land deal maintained a white
majority city council and urban population while furthering the geographic gap between
the suburbs and the city. This deal not only created Civil Rights issues within urban voting,
it sparked controversy within school desegregation. As federal forces, under Judge Robert
Merhige, progressively desegregated city schools by 1970, suburbanites confronted the
same Civil Rights education reform that white flight and municipal borders previously
excluded them from.
Chapter 3 uses two landmark federal cases to complete this study. First, the
aftermath of grassroots suburban resistance to busing and annexation inspired the Bradley
v. Richmond School Board case. The goal was to place black professionals in charge of a
fully integrated public school system. However, Bradley evolved into a complete
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consolidation of urban and suburban public schools. This put middle-class blacks in
opposition to suburban whites. Strange political alliances arose as urban whites and black
elites favored consolidation. School consolidation allowed white elites to politically
control suburbia while black elites controlled the public school system. Suburban white
and working-class black opposition united them against the consolidation. Both sides had
little to no interest in racially mixing their schools across municipal boundaries. In the end,
suburban whites and working-class blacks victoriously prevented the school consolidation,
but Richmond’s public schools experienced full city-wide busing in 1974.
Second, the Holt v City of Richmond, Virginia case, exposed how class identity
broke previously perceived racial solidarity. Working-class black leader Curtis Holt Sr.,
sued the city council for violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through the 1969
annexation. The Civil Rights movement caused dissent among black Richmonders over
which class should control the city’s power structure. To Holt, the annexation, which was
supported by black professionals, prevented him and working-class blacks from infiltrating
the city’s power structure. Black elites and white elites partnered to bring about the demise
of the Holt case. Stopping Holt removed federal attention from elite white efforts to control
the city council. To black professionals, Holt was a tool of the working-class who
overstepped his bounds by trying to usurp the politically powerful black elite.
The strange alliances did not stop with white and black elites siding against Curtis
Holt. Holt received financial support from suburban white organizations like the Broad
Rock Council of Civil Associations and lawyer Cabell Venable. Both suburbanites and
Venable wished to de-annex the 44,000 white suburbanites back into the class-centered
white suburbs of Chesterfield County. In the end, Richmond kept the annexed land, but the
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case facilitated white flight. Bradley and Holt finished the racial transition started in 1960.
Richmond’s population, public school system, and municipal power structure shifted from
white to black. The diversity of black political interest changed greatly, as the Civil Rights
Era presented blacks with the political opportunity to break ranks with each other.
However, what remained unchanged was that black elites retained control of black politics
in Richmond, despite Holt’s lawsuit being one of two major events to complete the white
transition out of the city. As black elites gained control of the power structure, they became
less responsive to the constituency that ignited their political ascendancy in 1960.
Today, Richmond residents’ intertwine race and class because Civil Rights
legislation did not remove race from Richmond’s political fabric. Geographic titles or
defined space carry race and class connotations, more now than they ever have throughout
the Richmond metropolitan area. Growing up in Chesterfield County, I noticed how black
and white suburban parents used race and class epitaphs to make sense of their racial
uncertainties. Terms like ghetto, urban, inner-city, unsafe, and sketchy were used to
classify urban spaces as black. When my friends and I heard these words from adults, we
understood the race and class connotations they alluded to. If the area, such as Richmond
city, was majority black, it was usually poor and unsafe; thus, it should be avoided by
children of privilege.
Conversely, my parents conditioned me to never classify or be classified with
majority black spaces, while always identifying with white identified space. In modernday Richmond, both races understand black as poverty stricken, violent, and uneducated,
while seeing white as wealthy, safe, and pleasant to be around. Ideas about race and class
being intimately connected through defined space resulted from the Civil Rights

14

movement’s failure to create a post-racial Richmond. Richmonders found new ways to
express their deepest insecurities about racial differences. My thesis describes how the
Richmond metropolitan area I grew up in during the 1990s and early 2000s, came directly
from the racial uncertainties of the 1960s and 1970s. My childhood interaction with
suburban race and class concepts was not abnormal, as my friends from college, who came
from metropolitan areas throughout the South, shared with me their similar interactions
with race and class being staunchly defined by space. Thus, our experiences should be
studied, through Richmond’s urban crisis, to understand how the connection between race,
class, and space came about and is still prevalent in post-Civil Rights America.
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Chapter 1: 1960-1966
In the Civil Rights Era, the former Confederate capital experienced a cosmic racial
shift in its power structure: city council and public schools. Starting with Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, Kansas and ending with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Civil Rights
was not just a movement, but as Gavin Wright said, it was a revolution because it radically
changed how Americans understood and dealt with the political implications of race.
Although the Civil Rights legislation should have created a post-racial Richmond, whites
and blacks ensured the opposite. As race transitioned from overtly codified to covert
political currency, both whites and blacks continuously used racial politics to achieve their
vision for Civil Rights Richmond. The three categories that best explain Civil Rights Era
Richmond are electoral politics, school desegregation, and annexation attempts. Between
1960 and 1966, the city transitioned from a 68% white populated city, with an all-white
city council and majority white public school system, to a 50/50 white-black population,
three black city councilmen, and a majority black public school student population. This
racial shift came at the helm of urban blacks using Civil Rights Era electoral advances and
school desegregation to rebuild their political and educational landscape while whites saw
Civil Rights changes as the means to either retain urban power or reinstitute racial
separation via white flight.8

8

Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the American South
(Harvard University Press, 2013), 4; Benjamin Campbell, Richmond’s Unhealed History (Brandylane
Publishers, Inc, 2012), 159-169; and Peter K. Eisinger, The Politics of Displacement: Racial and Ethnic
Transition in Three American Cities, (Academic Press, London, 1980), 5. I am defining Richmond’s Civil
Rights Era as the years between 1960 and 1977.

16

Electoral Politics
Why electoral politics and what does it tell us about Civil Rights Era Richmond?
The racial shift in Richmond’s city council campaigns illuminate, more than the
administrations that were elected, the social impact of black electoral increases, as well as
the class complexities that only post-Jim Crow America could expose. Pre-1960 elections
centered on white voters electing prominent conservative white businessmen to the city
council every two years. Post-1960 Richmond consisted of black voters helping elect
blacks and liberal whites to the city council. This happened at the behest of middle and
working-class blacks creating a new political landscape. However, this race-based
partnership had limits, as Civil Rights change meant different things to both sides. As
blacks carved their niche in electoral politics, professional and working-class black racial
ties were tested by internal and external forces, culminating in black professionals changing
their leadership methods to maintain their racialized voting bloc, which gave them political
power.
Civil Rights changes in Richmond began, not with Brown, but with local electoral
politics. The most evident aspect of Richmond’s power shift was the city council elections
between 1960 and 1966. Prior to 1960, affluent whites dominated the city council. Blacks
had minimal impact on the city council as well as council elections. There had been only
one post-Reconstruction black city councilman elected prior to 1960. This was in large part
due to state-sponsored measures and the Byrd Machine keeping black voting below thirty
percent. However, in 1960, this trend changed. As Virginia’s Jim Crow Era conservative
power structure was challenged by the liberal-minded Young Turks in the early 1960s,
Richmond’s white power structure came under attack as well. The black population and its
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voter participation rose above thrity percent between 1960 and 1966, enabling blacks to
use citywide voting to help elect three black councilmen, with one becoming the Vice
Mayor.9
Racial solidarity, through urban redevelopment, politically mobilized black
Richmond by 1960. The first issue was housing displacement. In 1955 and 1957, Richmond
experienced physical redevelopment through the construction of the Richmond-Petersburg
Turnpike and Interstate 95. These projects were purposefully and masterfully designed to
displace over 30,000 citizens, transforming downtown Richmond into a major shopping
district. Black homeowners made up 20,000 of the 30,000 displaced residents, most coming
from Jackson Ward, Richmond’s oldest and most prominent black neighborhood. There
was a vacant valley located four blocks north of Jackson Ward that could have “better”
supported the highway. However, the 1955 city council led by future Mayor Phil Bagley
and the City Planning Commission built the interstate and turnpike through Jackson Ward.
Despite opposition from the Carver Displacement League, headed by black Mortician
Oliver P. Chiles, the construction was approved by the Richmond Redevelopment and
Housing Authority. Since most blacks could not purchase new homes in the city’s highly

9

J. Harvey Wilkerson III, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics (University of Virginia
Press, 1968), 20-61. Harry Byrd was a Winchester aristocrat who owned a majority of Virginia’s media
outlets, including the Richmond News Leader. Byrd used political ties called “The Byrd Machine,” which
was a collection of local, state, and national politicians, to maintain conservative white supremacist control
over Virginia politics. His influence was felt more in Virginia’s Southside and Valley regions, controlling
who ran and won local, statewide, and national offices. However, as urban areas like Richmond gained more
importance through economic expansion and federal investment, Byrd suppressed attempts to remove power
from affluent whites within his circle. The Young Turks were college educated liberal politicians who
challenged the conservative Byrd Machine for political supremacy in Virginia during the 1950s and 60s.
Most were University of Virginia trained lawyers and politicians from the Richmond and Roanoke area. See
Wilkerson 263-97, for more information on the statewide power struggle and how it resonated during Civil
Rights Era Richmond.
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racist and competitive real estate market, many became public housing residents in the
city’s East End corridor.
Segregation became an issue that united black Richmonders. Urban blacks were
dissatisfied with white-owned downtown businesses charging similar prices for dissimilar
services. This frustration resulted in the Thalhimer’s Department store boycott from April
until Christmas of 1960. To Virginia Union professor Dr. Raymond Pierre Hylton, the
boycott was meant to economically and socially “send repercussions throughout the
South.” Black Richmonders were not as concerned with bankrupting downtown business,
as they were about establishing “human dignity” in their changing environment.
Residential displacement and segregation stripped blacks of their dignity because it
perpetuated generational black disenfranchisement. Housing displacement and segregation
not only inspired Richmond blacks to become politically active on the local level, it gave
them a cause to politically mobilize around.10
The partnership between black religious and political leadership created the
foundation for a political coalition between the professional and working classes. Although
men like Dr. Hylton and the Thalhimers’ boycott foot soldiers shared the same race, class
separated them. Black electoral ascendancy came when blacks worked together across
class boundaries; however, this was done by the only other commonality black
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Richmonders collectively shared: religion. Virginia Union professor William Thornton
began the Richmond Civic Council in 1958 later renamed the Crusade for Voters in 1960.
This voter organization operated under the leadership of lawyers, businessmen, academics,
and doctors like George A. Pannell and Milton Randolph. The Crusade connected with the
working-class majority through the Baptist Ministers Conference of Greater Richmond and
Vicinity. The “black Baptist leadership,” under Dr. Robert Taylor, worked side-by-side
with the Crusade to electorally mobilize working-class black voters. For black
Richmonders, the Baptist church was “dominant in the community.” Any political agenda
or leader who wished to capitalize on black numerical strength did so through the church.
Organized funding through First Baptist Church, Fourth Baptist Church, Sixth Baptist
Church, Baker PTA, and the Fairmount Teachers Club helped the Crusade pay voter
registration fees. Collectively, the church cemented the bonds that class separated. Both
sides did not necessarily like each other, however, in the face of racial discrimination,
politicians and church leadership partnered to control the outlook of Civil Rights Richmond
through city council elections. For professional blacks, this meant being political leaders,
and for working-class blacks, this meant supporting black leadership in the face of urban
redevelopment and economic inequality.11
The Crusade increased black electoral strength by changing the nature of black
voting. Crusade leadership switched black voting from the single-shot method to a fullslate approach. Single-shot allowed voting organizations to allocate all its votes to just one
candidate. This ensured the candidacy of one councilman while neglecting other
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candidates. Full-slate voting allowed the organization to nominate up to nine candidates at
once. Utilizing the full-slate method gave the Crusade the best chance at controlling the
overall outcome of the election. Instead of electing one councilman, the organization could
elect as many councilmen as its voting numbers allowed. The full-slate approach showed
that the Crusade was priming to impact all nine available seats, not just one.12
The Crusade’s work did not go unnoticed by white politicians. By June of 1960,
the Crusade registered over 14,000 black voters for the upcoming election. This was the
most black voters Richmond had for a municipal election to date, not to mention it
represented over half of the overall voting population. The Crusade’s success in registering
14,000 black voters allowed them to issue all twenty-two white candidates a questionnaire
about how each of them would serve the expanded black voting bloc. Normally, white
candidates hesitated to solicit black support in fear of losing white voters. However, the
Crusade’s 14,000 voters could potentially swing the election in any candidate’s favor. All
but one candidate responded to the questionnaire by supporting open communication
between the burgeoning black electorate and its councilmanic candidates. Biracial
partnership over city affairs was to be “fairly and intelligently” split between the black

12

Richmond News Leader, May 13, 1960; Richmond Times Dispatch, April 27, 1964; Richmond African
American, June 11, 1960; and John V. Moeser and Rutledge B. Dennis, The Politics of Annexation:
Oligarchic Power in a Southern City (Boston: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1982), 17. The city council
consisted of nine members who were elected in an at-large format, serving a two-year term. The mayor was
elected by the nine council members from amongst themselves. The pre-1948 city charter had ward-style
council voting and a separate at-large mayoral election. I speculate the charter was changed for a few reasons.
First being the election of black councilman Oliver Hill in 1948. Second, the city’s black population grew
every year after 1945. With ward-style voting, blacks could grow to control various urban wards and elect
more black councilmen and even a black mayor. However, the black voting population never exceeded the
white voting population because urban whites lived in the West End and Southside, two areas that were
constantly expanding, while black communities were confined within redline downtown and East End real
estate borders. Because of residential restrictions, red-lining, poll taxes and literacy test, blacks voting was
minimized by at-large voting. Changing councilmanic elections to at-large voting, while maintaining a white
voting majority that had no Jim Crow voting restrictions, allowed white Richmonders to control the city
council elections. This white controlled council had the power to elect the mayor from amongst themselves,
establishing what Moeser called an oligarchical white power structure over municipal politics.

21

community and the white city council, said one candidate. This open line of communication
illuminated how the twilight of Jim Crow caused a shift in urban affairs. Black
Richmonders removed whites from the center of local politics. Although it was not an even
playing field, blacks had more electoral influence than ever before.13
The Crusade’s 14,000 black voters impacted the outcome of the election. On June
14, 1960, Crusade voters helped elect seven candidates to the city council. With only 27,
853 Richmond voters, blacks comprised 50.2% of the overall electorate. This allowed black
voters, for the first time since 1948, to make a significant impact in at-large urban elections.
Black voter turnout was at an all-time high, as it coincided with a 20% Southern urban
black voter increase since 1950. Black voter increase was more visible because more than
90,000 white citizens had fled to surrounding suburban counties between 1950 and 1960.
From this moment on, white Richmonders would not have a monopoly on who ran city
government. Again, Civil Rights Richmond did not begin with Brown in 1954, but it began
in 1960 when blacks broke the white monopoly over city council elections.14
Crusade leaders were well aware of the social implications resulting from the recent
election. Crusade president George A. Pannell mentioned, in an open letter, that electoral
politics made black voters a “potent force” in Richmond’s post-Jim Crow landscape.
Increased black voter presence was not “a step in the direction of harmony,” as Pannell
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suggested. Rather, it was a step towards remaking urban politics fit within the middle-class
led black community paradigm. The Crusade furthered its Civil Rights platform by
mentioning that blacks of both professional and working classes were not “divided in our
aims for first-class citizenship.” Both groups sought social equality through electoral
politics however, it was the goal of professionals like Pannell to ensure working-class
blacks were content with middle-class leadership. In closing, Pannell issued a warning to
future white candidates. “The colored voters of today will not be long fooled by anyone”
into thinking that dividing black leadership best serves the entire race. This open letter was
a clear message to white Richmonders that the black electoral influence was united along
racial lines and would not be divided by class differences.15
Black Richmonders used their strong 1960 performance to establish a controversial
1962 electoral platform. The Crusade registered 11,000 more black voters than in the 1960
election. To gain the Crusade’s endorsement, candidates had to support the removal of the
city’s Pupil Assignment Plan, a school attendance ordinance, a wage increase for municipal
workers to $1.15 per hour, and a proposal for ward-style voting. All of these issues were
Civil Rights measures designed to destabilize Jim Crow. School attendance ordinances and
removal of Harry Byrd’s Pupil Assignment Plan targeted the city’s refusal to racially
desegregate public schools. Support for ward-style voting increased black voting strength,
given that blacks had the most populated ward districts throughout the city. The municipal
workers salary increase placed more purchasing power in the hands of black city workers
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and the black community. This platform, which benefitted working and middle-class
blacks, resulted from the newfound political agency the 1960 election provided them.16
The Crusade platform exposed Richmond’s racial rigidity. The city was for all
intents and purposes racially segregated in 1962. Whites and blacks lived in separate
neighborhoods, shopped at separate malls, and worked in separate venues. Segregation was
not as much forced as it was accepted. Despite the black voter increase, whites still held a
56% majority. It was not until 1964 that Richmond got its second post-Reconstruction
black councilman. Richmond’s white majority was, like most white Virginians, largely
conservative and wanted nothing to do with liberal or black leadership. Any white
candidate who openly supported the Crusade platform risked losing a council seat. Since
the Crusade had to allocate its votes to white candidates, as historians John V. Moeser and
Rutledge M. Dennis suggested, white politicians secretly negotiated with Crusade leaders
for black votes. Crusade support came in the form of an endorsement and news articles
about the white candidate being a friend to the black community. Since many white
candidates engaged in this activity, they would often accuse “the other of making secret
deals with Negro political leaders” to secure the dwindling white voter base in the
upcoming election.17
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The Fair Employment Practices Ordinance, passed just weeks before the election,
provides a possible example of secret Crusade deals with white candidates. The Crusade’s
platform included a measure that not only increased municipal workers salaries, but
removed racial discrimination from salaried city employment. According to historian and
attorney Dwight Carter Holton, grandson of eventual Virginia Governor Linwood Holton,
seventy-five percent of black municipal workers were non-salaried and had less job
security than their white counterparts. This ordinance was passed during the election season
and at the height of speculation about secret deals between incumbent councilmen like
Robert C. Throckmorton, Eleanor P. Sheppard, and Crusade leaders. Although no foul play
was ever proven, Throckmorton, Sheppard, and three other councilmen gained Crusade
support immediately following the passage of the ordinance in May of 1962.18
The outcome of the 1962 election confirmed what the 1960 election suggested.
Seven of nine Crusade supported candidates won council seats. Despite five of the seven
Crusade sponsored candidates being endorsed by the wealthy white voter organization,
Richmond Civic Association (RCA), two councilmen were solely endorsed by the Crusade,
while only one councilman was elected with a lone RCA endorsement. The one RCA
endorsed councilman, future mayor Phil Bagley, finished fifth, receiving only 9,772 votes.
Whereas, the two Crusade sponsored candidates finished first and eighth, one receiving
9,200 votes and the other receiving 11,348 votes. Even with a radical platform and
endorsing two losing black candidates against a white majority, the Crusade repeated its
results from the 1960 election. These results read not of plateauing, but of growth between
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the two elections. In 1960, the Crusade had no organized platform and competed with two
white voter organizations. In 1962, the Crusade had a solidified platform and rivaled a
unified white voter organization. As the Crusade increased its difficulty, the results
remained the same. This clearly illustrates that the further Richmond moved into the Civil
Rights Era, the more influence its blacks exerted in city council elections.19
White voter organizations solidified themselves against the Crusade in the 1964
election. The RCA, along with other white voter organizations, formed Richmond Forward
which comprised of old money conservatives like James Wheat, as well as new money
liberals like Henry Miller. Their agenda was to secure and further Richmond’s white
business interest during the Civil Rights Era and white economic flight. Richmond
Forward’s candidates supported urban redevelopment and annexation, both of which
extended Jim Crow Era politics by disenfranchising black electoral, economic, and
residential potential. Richmond Forward garnered a reputation for “political manipulation”
because its candidates were all Crusade rivals who set aside their differences for what
appeared to be a continuation of white councilmanic control. They are a bunch of “string
pullers who think Richmond begins and ends at Sixth and Broad,” exclaimed Phil Bagley
in a Times-Dispatch interview. This coalition stopped at nothing to ensure that Richmond’s
councilmanic control did not slip into Crusade hands in 1964 and future elections.20
The Crusade faced problems of its own in this election. One of the problems came
in the form of a white liberal named Howard Carwile. The son of a wealthy Charlotte
County tobacco farmer, Carwile, was a lifelong liberal politician who championed “poor
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white people and the poor negro people, the small white businessman and the small negro
businessman [to] abandon their prejudice, work together and vote together” in urban
politics. Despite his popularity with working-class blacks, Carwile lost every state and
local election he competed in for the last eighteen years. His recent councilmanic failures,
according to him, came largely from the absence of the “heavy colored vote” controlled by
the Crusade. Black Richmonders rarely broke rank in urban elections during the 1960s,
even for Carwile who helped save the historically black Fulton and Idlewood
neighborhoods from redevelopment.21
Carwile’s open criticism of the Crusade exposed the class-centered flaws in black
electoral leadership. Carwile criticized the Crusade’s tendency to “consistently endorse
those candidates who apparently are sure winners.” More specifically, Carwile targeted the
Crusade’s support for B.A. Cephas (a black conservative) and Phil Bagley (a white
conservative), both of whom were highly favored to win council seats. The nominations of
Bagley and “Mr. Cephas indicates conclusively a working alliance between the aristocracy
of far West End and Negro intelligencia around [Virginia] Union University.” Carwile’s
criticism suggested that black professionals worked alongside elite whites to control the
councilmanic outcome. This is why a man like Carwile, who fancied himself a champion
of racial equality and political pragmatism, could lose black support to “a rabid
segregationist” and supporter of gentrification, whom the Crusade did not endorse just two
years prior. Despite his open criticism, Carwile lost again as an independent candidate in
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1964. However, garnering twenty-six percent of the urban vote as an independent forced
the Crusade to endorse Carwile in 1966.22
As blacks gained a foothold in electoral politics, they became less solidified than
in previous elections. The 1960 and 1962 racial solidarity was in danger by 1964, due to
working-class blacks wanting their own political leadership. Only three black candidates
ran in 1964, but two, Ronald Charity and Neverett Eggleston Jr., were endorsed by the
working-class organization The Voter’s Voice. Other dissenting black voter organizations
included the West End Council of Leagues, Leagues of the 19th and 24th precincts, and the
West End Improvement League. Reasons varied for the rise of multiple black voter
organizations. Some blacks believed Howard Carwile and were convinced the Crusade was
“working hand-in-glove with the R[ichmond] F[orward].” Working-class blacks suspected
that Crusade leadership developed more than just “a corresponding relationship with white
elites.” Rather, black elites exchanged political favors that benefited only the black middleclass. The Crusade rarely endorsed black candidates, but the most notable one, B.A.
Cephas, served on the pro-redevelopment City Housing Committee following the 1962
election. That was the same election that featured public speculation about white
councilmen disbursing municipal appointments to Crusade professionals for electoral
support. Coincidentally, Richmond Forward supported Cephas’ 1964 campaign.
Nevertheless, black electoral growth allowed urban blacks to be less electorally united than
in years past.23
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The Crusade reminded black Richmonders that electoral camaraderie, not internal
division, fully utilized the black vote. The Crusade pled with black Richmonders to “keep
our vote solid” because “this is the only way we can have political influence.” Crusade
leaders used terms like “we” and “our” to place race above the seemingly obvious class
differences between themselves and its working-class voting bloc. To the Jim Crow Era
Crusade leadership, a diversified black vote ensured political suicide. Political survival
came through unitary support for black leaders, who were coincidentally middle-class
Crusade professionals. Crusade leaders wanted to maintain their monopoly on Civil Rights
Era electoral change. Racial “solidarity is more important than one election or any
candidate.” With a solid black vote “we can always vote out a bad candidate, but we cannot
do this if we don’t keep our solidarity.”24
Black electoral influence reached historic heights in the 1964 election. The
Crusade’s appeal paid off as eight of its nine candidates won council seats. This was the
most candidates that blacks helped elect into office in city history. One of the eight was
affluent black real estate broker B.A. Cephas Jr., making him the second postReconstruction black councilman elected since Oliver Hill in 1948. With Richmond
Forward and the Crusade combining to elect seven of the nine councilmen, the local media
recognized that “better to do white business community centered in the West End and the
Negro Leadership ”controlled the electoral “balance of power.” In just four years, black
Richmonders had a considerable share of electoral influence. This was during the era of
poll taxes and literacy tests, which significantly hindered black voting potential. As
America received a shift in codified racial norms with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Richmond
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experienced a clear transition in the racial makeup of its urban elections councilmanic
leadership.25
Special circumstances dictated the terms of the 1966 election. For the first time in
city history, Richmond’s population was forty-eight percent black, an increase from fortysix percent in 1964. Black voter registration increased by sixty-five percent from 1964,
making the grand total of 29,970. Increased black voter registration came from the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) being signed into law on August 6, 1965. The VRA prohibited state and
local mandated tactics, such as literacy tests, from registering black voters in local,
regional, and national elections. As black voter registration increased, white registration
increased also, but their increase was only 13% going from 52,172 to 58,827. This was
Richmond’s first election in which the black voting numbers closely resembled their actual
growing population. The numerical increase, and the passage of the VRA, forced the
Crusade to change the way it handled the black vote going forward, in that it took on more
of a working-class black image. 26
Both the Crusade and Richmond Forward chose black candidates who could secure
the expanded working-class black vote. According to historian James Oliver Perry,
previous electoral success, increased black population, and the VRA, caused trouble for
middle-class run black voter organizations. Before the VRA, the Crusade was the sole
avenue for many working-class blacks to enter electoral politics. By 1966, the VRA
allowed blacks to enter electoral politics on their own terms. With the removal of racial
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discrimination from voting, which black professionals used to consolidate political power,
the Crusade nominated black candidates, hoping that white liberals and black faces would
keep the expanded working-class black vote. The Crusade supported NAACP lawyer
Henry Marsh III, black realtor B.A. Cephas, Howard Carwile, and affluent black
businessman, Winfred Mundle. Similarly, Richmond Forward endorsed B.A. Cephas and
Winfred Mundle, both of whom supported annexation and urban redevelopment.
Nominating black candidates, in the face of a near 50% black population and electorate,
meant securing the important working-class black vote for both sides.27
The Crusade’s selection process caused internal rift within its leadership. In June
of 1965, George Pannell resigned as Crusade president. Although white and black media
outlets reported the event with no significant details, Howard Carwile saw it differently.
Pannell’s resignation, according to the Crusade, exposed inherent racial and political flaws
within the Crusade’s nomination process. It was rumored that Pannell did not support
William Thornton’s nomination of Cephas and Mundle because they did not fit the
“Crusade agenda” against annexation and urban redevelopment. The resignation only
confirmed that the Crusade was a “color-based organization” that used race to consolidate
electoral power from blacks whom racism actually affected. This resignation led some,
mainly critics like Carwile, to speculate that the Crusade was nominating black candidates
to maintain control over the open voter registration process created by the VRA.28
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Richmond Forward aggressively campaigned to the expanded black voter base and
used the Richmond Times-Dispatch to portray the Crusade as race hustlers using workingclass black votes to further their political careers. On June 9, 1966, the Times-Dispatch
produced the editorial “A Message to the Negro Voters of Richmond.” The Times-Dispatch
praised the “public-spirited, responsible leadership of Richmond Forward” candidates
against the “private-regarding, autocratically controlled Crusade for Voters.” The editorial
implied that black electoral power unjustly belonged to the Crusade. Black leadership
wants “[you] not to use your own intelligence in deciding how to vote…not to give any
thought to the subject. Simply vote as they tell you to.” As an alternative to racially
autocratic voting, Richmond Forward was “publically identified… [and] work for the best
interest of the community… people who give time…people who provide significant
support for the Urban League and other community agencies…they are the people to whom
leaders in your community turn when they want assistance in raising funds for
predominantly negro institutions of higher learning.”29
The Crusade went on the offensive to secure working-class black votes from
conservative white politicians. The Crusade responded to Richmond Forward and the
Times-Dispatch with an open letter titled “Who are the Richmond Newspapers?” “They
are the champions of segregation,” said the Crusade. “They cried No, No, Never to the U.S.
Supreme Court Decision of 1954. They banned a Pogo Comic strip that ridiculed
segregation…[they] have repeatedly attacked every organization that has fought for and
gained Negro rights…They attacked the NAACP; They attacked Martin Luther
King…now they are attacking the Richmond Crusade for Voters… Long before any other
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group cared, the Crusade fought alone for Negro political rights in Richmond.” Since the
media and white politicians saw the potential of working-class black votes by 1966, the
Crusade adamantly reminded the 48% minority that whites wanted not to serve the black
constituency, but use them “because you have gained a measure of political power” from
past elections and the VRA.30
The Crusade survived the impact of the VRA and George Pannell’s resignation. On
June 14, 1966, the Crusade helped elect five councilmen to office. Although three fewer
Crusade candidates won in 1966 than in 1964, this election featured a post-Reconstruction
high three black councilmen. The Crusade achieved a new level of independence, in that
the election proved the Crusade could get unpopular candidates elected. This was applied
to no other than Henry Marsh III and Howard Carwile. Marsh III headed local school
desegregation cases and was a thorn in the side of many white conservatives. Carwile,
while finishing last amongst his colleagues, made very few friends in opposing urban
redevelopment. The VRA altered Richmond’s electoral landscape by removing Jim Crow
Era politicians, like the Crusade, from gatekeeping black votes. The election results clearly
shows how the landscape change forced the Crusade to expand its measures of maintaining
the working-class vote by nominating black and white liberals.31
White Richmonders understood the implications of the black electoral evolution in
just seven years. The Norfolk Virginia-Pilot article predicted that “June 1968 deadline
is…the point, according to computations by experts on population shifts, when Richmond
comes face to face with the possibility that Negroes could take over control of the City
Council.” White fears were amplified with the possibility of a black city council in
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Richmond. This white fear stemmed from population growth, the VRA, and voter steering
from the black professional class. Although electoral gains were important, by no means
did it alone cause Richmond’s racial transition. School desegregation and the annexation
crisis combined with electoral changes to racially transition the city from its 70% pre-1960
white population to its 50/50 racial split by December of 1966.32
School Desegregation
The black middle-class used school desegregation, similar to electoral politics, as a
tool to capture urban power from white elites in the midst of nationwide Civil Rights
changes. On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court gave black politicians the political
currency to remake public education with the Brown decision. This judicial mandate
attacked racially segregated public education, a white supremacist and oligarchical
foundation of power. Segregated education allowed whites to disenfranchise blacks
through limited access to social mobility. Segregated and inferior education ensured that
color and condition remained fixed. Poverty, economically, socially, and legally, remained
black. Like most southern cities, Richmond City Public Schools remained segregated after
Brown. Through various court battles between 1960 and 1966, black professionals thrusted
the city into the Civil Rights Era by constantly redefining how the school board complied
with Brown. Equal access to public schools removed black education from the periphery
and placed it at the core of political and social life. This reinvention of how black education
operated, like electoral politics, pushed Richmond into the national Civil Rights movement,
and more specifically, into racial transition.33
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Richmond’s educational segregation reflected a deeper legacy of physical
separation, or as historian Christopher Silver suggest, a “Separate City.” Blacks and whites
lived separate lives in the same city. There were few places that blacks and whites had
intimate interaction. Public schools reinforced societal segegration. According to Silver,
state and local white elites used Jim Crow laws to ensure both whites and blacks to live
separated by racialized class-defined spaces. On a national level, Federal Housing
Authority lending practices, urban redevelopment, white flight, and redlining, strengthened
racial segregation by placing it within the economy through real estate practices. Public
schools did not develop into racially segregated entities, they were created as racialy
segregated institutions, used to indoctrinate young whites and blacks that racial separation
was not only normal, but an essential facet of life. Although many places began
destabilizing segregationist school systems in the late 1950s, it was not until 1960 that
Richmonders broke their societal legacy of limited black-white adolescent interaction.34
The desegregation snowball began in 1958, with middle-class blacks challenging
the limits of Massive Resistance. Local blacks began Richmond’s educational reform
through the Warden v. Richmond School Board case in 1958. The suit was filed by the
parents of Lorna R. Warden. The Pupil Placement Board, a Massive Resistance agency put
into place by Senator Harry Byrd to ensure that Virginia schools remained segregated,
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rejected six black children from admission into an all-white neighborhood school.
Realizing that every white child in their neighborhood was assigned to the all-white school,
Warden’s attorneys sued the city for violating Brown. This suit, like others that followed,
was a part of a larger movement to remove racial disenfranchisement from public
education. The plaintiffs asked the court to include all black Richmond children in the
lawsuit, given that they fell victim to the Pupil Placement Board’s purposeful design to
illegally maintain racial segregation. In an effort of temporary appeasement, in 1961, the
Virginia Supreme Court and the Placement Board allowed Lorna Renee Warden to attend
the all-white neighborhood school; however, the other five plaintiffs, as well as black
Richmond students en masse were not admitted into any white public school. Nevertheless,
local middle-class black pressure forced Richmond’s public school officials to do what
Brown itself could not: integrate.35
Immediately after the Warden case hit the docket in 1960, Richmond’s white power
structure attempted to control the imminent desegregation process. If handled incorrectly,
school desegregation could place political power in the hands of local black professionals,
who were eager to garner political power in the middle of the Civil Rights Era power
vacuum. Many urban whites, like Attorney General J. Lindsay, lamented that “integration
of the races in the school system will set education back” because “[Richmond] will close
schools rather than permit them to be operated with Negro and white pupils in the same
classroom.” Although some felt that Richmond’s racial divide was so deep that school
closures would replace segregated schools, state and local legislators knew better. The fact
that Richmond was the financial and cultural center of Virginia made its public school
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system vital to the regional and national image of the state. Despite Charlottesville,
Norfolk, Warren County, and Prince Edward County schools closing, for Richmond,
closure was not an option. 36
After cleaning house, white officials tokenly desegregated public schools, to keep
their control over urban affairs. On February 24, 1960, Richmond Pupil Placement Board’s
Andrew A. Fairley, Beverly H. Randolph Jr., and Hugh V. White issued their letters of
resignation. All three agreed that the threat of federal closure would legislators to integrate
Richmond Public Schools, something their collective conscience did not permit them to
do. One of the three men issued his disappointment with city officials not “fight[ing] with
every legal and honorable means of mixing the races in the public schools.” The newly
appointed Pupil Placement Board members, University of Virginia Professor Earnest J.
Oglesby, State Department Coordinator Alfred L. Wingo, and Department of Education
Assistant Supervisor of Rehabilitation Edward T. Justis, met on August 15, 1960, to begin
Richmond’s in-house desegregation. This effort resulted in only two black children being
placed into white schools. However, on September 6, 1960, Richmond’s public schools
were officially integrated. Richmond’s token integration coincided with a statewide effort
to place enough black students into white schools to prevent any major NAACP lawsuit
forcing federal judges to desegregate public schools. By September of 1960, there were
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over 200,000 black students throughout the state and less than 170 of them were enrolled
in traditional white schools.37
Professional blacks pushed harder for desegregation by testing the limits of token
integration. In 1961, Wallace Reid Calloway, son of prominent black physician and local
Civil Rights advocates William C. and Alice Calloway, was denied placement into a white
neighborhood school (Chandler Middle School). The Calloways lived in one of
Richmond’s few interracial neighborhoods, in which black and white children were placed
in racially identifiable schools. The Calloways challenge the Placement Board’s placement,
forcing the board to review its initial placement. The Calloway controversy, like the
Warden case, was strategic because the Calloways understood Richmond’s school
desegregation was a part of an elaborate token regime. In fact, Calloways later argued, in
court, that the Placement Board allegedly reached its unofficial black quota for the city’s
white public schools, thus their son was denied. Although the local NAACP threatened to
file a class action lawsuit against the city, Richmond’s Pupil Placement Board reaffirmed
the original decision. The board had a legal leg to stand on because a black school was
geographically closer (only by twelve feet) to the Calloways’ home.38
Despite the unfavorable ruling, the Calloway case brought unwanted attention to
the Richmond’s Pupil Placement Board practices. The Calloway controversy allowed Civil
Rights attorneys and local NAACP members Henry Marsh III and Oliver Hill to expose
the Placement Board’s usage of racial criteria in public school placements, as well as the
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lengths white city officials went to maintain racial segregation. Despite the Calloway loss,
the public attention it drew, according to school desegregation historian Robert Pratt,
allowed the local NAACP to openly “demand speedier compliance with Brown.” The
demand was followed by the placement of thirty-seven black students into white schools
in the 1961-1962 school year. The Pupil Placement Board’s segregationist placements
caused the Crusade for Voters to run their 1962 campaign on the abolishment of the
Placement Board and a mandatory school attendance ordinance, forcing white children in
black dominated areas to attend similar schools. Not receiving any reprisal from city
councilmen about placement practices, NAACP member Minerva Bradley, her attorneys
Samuel Tucker and Henry Marsh III, and ten other black parents filed the Bradley v.
Richmond School Board lawsuit. This suit, like the Warden case, was a part of a concerted
effort to completely desegregate city schools and use Civil Rights legislation to remove
educational disenfranchisement from Richmond’s public schools. 39
Bradley attorneys furthered Warden’s cause by turning school desegregation into
political power for the black middle class. “Virginia has the largest and most effective
token integration plan in the county,” however Virginian blacks were not satisfied “with
even the best tokenism,” said Roy Wilkins at the NAACP’s Virginia Convention. Wilkins
foreshadowed his NAACP colleagues attempt to use Brown for political influence through
education reform. While asking the court to “[require] the defendants to transfer the pupils
from Negro public schools to white public schools,” attorneys Henry Marsh III and Samuel
Tucker requested the city “be enjoined from operating racially segregated schools and be
required to submit to the District Court a plan of desegregation.” To better their chances
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for a dismissal, the Pupil Placement Board assigned “90 additional Negro pupils” to white
schools the following school year. The increase of black placements to white schools, in
the midst of Bradley, illuminated how middle-class blacks used Brown to renegotiate urban
power. Just as white elites controlled Richmond through segregating public schools, black
professionals used desegregation to relinquish power from white elites. Segregated
schooling was built on white leaders not sharing power with black leadership; therefore the
black elites ensured that desegregated schooling came with white elites negotiating power
with them in a way that Jim Crow prevented, through integration.40
Bradley put Richmond public schools in a state of disarray. On March 10, 1963,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Bradley plaintiffs, finding
Richmond City Public Schools in violation of Brown for maintaining racially segregated
schools. The sociopolitical implications were astounding. The court ruled that Richmond
had to work with the Bradley attorneys to construct “adequate” desegregation plans. This
was the first time the federal government required white city officials to share power with
black leaders. This, also, marked the first time blacks inspired actual white concern over
how Richmond’s public education should racially function. If public schools were to
continue their existence, it would be at the discretion of federal compliance to white and
black leaders negotiating the racial makeup of public schools.41
The Bradley ruling illuminated how white supremacy forged the connection
between school segregation and city politics. “Had we attempted to integrate the schools
in the early years,” said School Board President and eventual Supreme Court Justice Lewis
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F. Powell Jr., it “would have resulted in closing the schools.” Many knew that the city
council “provided funds to operate the public schools,” however, many councilmen were
“stridently opposed to any integration,” personally and professionally. Court ordered
biracial cooperation seemed impossible because “both Richmond newspapers opposed
integration, as did Virginia governors, and the majority of the Virginia Assembly.” The
original Pupil Placement Board members who resigned on June 1, 1960 were not outliers
in their personal and professional opposition to integrated schools. Rather, they were a part
of generational obstruction to any level of educational equality between blacks and
whites.42
Biracial cooperation pushed Richmond’s school desegregation crisis away from
tokenism and towards its second stage: Freedom of Choice. On March 19, 1963, the
Richmond School Board formulated, the city council agreed, and the court approved the
Freedom of Choice Plan. Freedom of Choice allowed families of both races to choose their
children’s schools system. However, the Placement Board approved or denied the request
based on factors such as “adequate” transportation, competency compared to his or her
peers, and overall fit. Federal Judge John Butzner, NAACP lawyers Henry Marsh III and
Samuel Tucker, Superintendent Henry I. Willet, and School Board Vice-Chairman Frank
S. Calkins felt considerably “happy” with the Freedom of Choice Plan. Although Marsh
and Tucker had reservations about Pupil Placement remaining the gatekeepers of
integration, the biracial coalition made history by slowly removing Jim Crow from
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Richmond public schools. Marsh later challenged Freedom of Choice in the Supreme Court
he discovered that the color-blind driving factor of personal choice perpetuated racial
segregation in public schools.43
Freedom of Choice’s inability to desegregate schools forced federal authorities to
investigate Richmond’s public school system. In 1964, the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) placed Richmond Public School System under
investigation. HEW’s investigation began after Henry Marsh’s request to remove the Pupil
Placement Board from Richmond Public Schools was denied. Richmond bureacrats were
not alone in opposing school desegregation, as school systems across Virginia refused to
adhere to Brown. The General Assembly’s most effective measure was releasing state
funds to school systems refusing to integrate, while cutting off state funds to any integrated
school system. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave HEW authority to remove federal funds
from any school system found in violation of Brown, regardless of state and local law.
Therefore, the U.S. Commissioner of Education Dr. Woodrow Wilkerson charged
Virginia’s State Board of Education Deputy Superintendent Harry R. Elmore with ensuring
Virginia’s public school systems adhered to both Brown and the Civil Rights Act. Any
school system refusing to comply with Elmore’s regional meetings and interracial
consolidation plans were barred from receiving federal funds and would be sued by the
Justice Department in federal court.44
With federal attention on Virginia’s public schools, black professionals used Brown
to test the limits of their political power. “Federal control was very evident” as on January
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22, 1965, U.S. Commissioner of Education Dr. Woodrow Wilkerson assured
Superintendent Willet, School Board President Powell and Mayor Phil Bagley that federal
funds would be removed if they did not create a desegregation plan that conformed to Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act. This threat came on the heels of Henry Marsh III’s and Samuel
Tucker’s victory in the U.S. Supreme Court. Marsh and Tucker won an appeal overruling
Judge Butzner’s Freedom of Choice Plan for Richmond. Freedom of Choice was used in
many desegregating southern school districts; however, Richmond’s Freedom of Choice
plan maintained de facto segregation. Not one white child attended a black school, and few
black children attended white schools. “You could feel a political change,” as black
professionals, for the second time, used Civil Rights law to gain more authority in the
outlook of public education.45
By 1966, professional black political gains in education inspired negative racial
tension. During the 1965-66 academic school year, Richmond’s white population fell three
percent from the previous year, putting it at about fifty percent. As the white population
dwindled, the white student population followed. Richmond hosted a 64% black student
majority, with whites being at a staggering 36% and declining. While many white families
fled to suburban public and private schools, urban race relations worsened. In Richmond,
both blacks and whites used Freedom of Choice to stay in segregated schools. White
families refused to send their children to schools that were “identifiably black in any way,”
according to Pratt. Black families were haunted with stories about persecution by white
students “when there was no teacher supervision.” This behavior only reassured black
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families not to send their children “where they were not welcomed.” Using Freedom of
Choice to attend white schools had economic implications on the black household. “Blacks
were threatened and were actually fired for expressing their support for desegregation.”
“Rather courageous” were the blacks who sent their children to white schools, a risk many
refused to take. These challenges rendered Richmond’s Freedom of Choice useless in
achieving integration. However, Richmond continued this program until it was federally
removed in 1968.46
Between 1960 and 1966, Civil Rights Era Richmond was bolstered by school
desegregation. Alone, electoral politics did not shift municipal power to the black elite.
Education reform, through the removal of racial segregation and the political uncertainty
that followed, forced white politicians to negotiate political power with the black
professional class. The shift of overt segregation into more covert means retaining Jim
Crow, via tokenism and Freedom of Choice, and black electoral gains caused white city
council members to reach across the aisle to suburban leadership for help maintaining a
white majority in the heart of the former Confederacy. Racial solidarity had its classcentered limits. For whites, racial limits were tested when class interests collided over the
economic and racial importance of Richmond during the Civil Rights Era.
Annexation Crisis
For white leadership, electoral politics and school desegregation demolished their
Jim Crow-style power structure over Richmond. The shifting electoral demographic and
school desegregation greased the wheels of Richmond’s racial transition from a majority
white to majority black city. “Whites wanted to maintain control of the city of Richmond,”
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amidst Civil Rights Era changes. “So how do you do it, that was the question” white city
and state officials were obsessed with according to historian John V. Moeser. The answer
was annexation. However, as suburban leaders gained political power through industrial
and white middle-class migration, they became enemies to urban white officials.
Suburbanites saw the fall of Jim Crow as the means to segregate themselves from Civil
Rights changes in Richmond. Between 1960 and 1966, suburban whites gained and used
their political identity to prevent their affluent white neighbors from annexing their
Chesterfield and Henrico County suburbs. As city officials endlessly searched for
solutions, they were repeatedly blocked by the middle-class whites, ultimately forcing the
General Assembly to intervene as the city went from 70% to 50% white between 1950 and
1966.47
Before annexation, Richmond’s white politicians wished to offset white flight by
maintaining Richmond’s white majority through a simple merger. The Richmond City
Council’s six member Richmond-Henrico Consolidation Committee proposed a merger
that would consolidate Henrico County with Richmond City. The merger would make over
105,000 middle-class white suburbanites Richmond residents by January 1, 1962. The
consolidated city would have five boroughs, four in the old Henrico borders and one in
“the old city.” Although white city officials were willing to share territory with suburban
leaders, they were not so willing to share political power. The merger would include eleven
councilmen with four coming from Richmond, one from the four boroughs in Henrico, and
three being elected at-large from the consolidated city. Richmond outnumbered Henrico
by over 100,000 people and by more than 22,000 white voters. Therefore, the three at-large
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council seats would undoubtedly have been inhabited by Richmond politicians, giving the
city a regular seven-to-four councilmanic advantage over their suburban neighbors.48
The reasons for the merger were, as Moeser and Silver alluded too, racially coded.
White flight and its economic implications led to the 1961 city council proposing the
Henrico merger. The 1960 election, which mobilized 14,000 black voters, and the Warren
case, forcing school officials to desegregate public schools, signaled the beginning of the
end of what many saw coming up to ten years prior. Richmond was getting blacker. The
breakdown of segregation between the forty-two percent black population and over sixty
percent black public school population sent white residents to surrounding suburban
counties. Although recuperating the lost tax base financially incentivized the merger, what
that tax base socially represented remained racially coded. “Race remained at the heart of
the controversy over the merger,” said Silver. The civility from which white Richmonders
spoke about white flight illuminated racial fears about the former capital of the
Confederacy hosting a black majority. Metropolitan residents understood “the city tax base
is automatically lowered when the black population increases.” However, the reasons
behind this well-known fact remained undiscussed publicly. Metropolitan whites “feared
being in the minority” because blacks reminded them of the inequality Jim Crow produced
and the economic and social privilege white Richmonders enjoyed at the expense of black
residents.49
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Henrico suburbanites made it clear that they would not voluntarily cede their land
and white citizenry to the council. Henrico residents voted against the merger on December
12, 1961, with a sixty-five percent majority. Voters in one Henrico District (Tuckahoe)
supported the merger. Despite Henrico’s Board of Supervisors president S.A. Burnette
noting that the county was “wide open so far as any cooperation in support of the
metropolitan area is concerned,” it was clear that Henrico residents were unwilling to help
the city council keep Richmond majority white. Richmond City Manager Horace H.
Edwards felt suburbanites voted “with their hearts instead of their heads.” Their hearts were
consumed with the racially identifiable class-centered suburban lifestyle. Yet, their heads
represented the “one mind” or prejudice they shared with urban whites about “a black
takeover of Richmond.” Desperation forced city officials to become politically aggressive;
therefore, on December 26, 1961, the council announced its intentions to file an annexation
ordinance with the Commonwealth of Virginia against Henrico and Chesterfield
Counties.50
The city council began its hostile takeover of the suburban white majority in 1962.
On January 1, the council officially filed an annexation suit against Henrico and
Chesterfield Counties within each respective circuit courts. The council, along with City

Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 14, 1961; “Annexation Will Meet Resistance,” Richmond Times
Dispatch, December 14, 1961; Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 222; David G. Temple Merger Politics: Local
Government Consolidation in Tidewater Virginia (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 1972), 1;
Christopher Silver, “Impediment to Greatness: The Failure of City County Consolidation in the 1960s”
(Ph.D. diss, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1981), 8; and Chester W. Bain, A Body Incorporate:
The Evolution of City-County Separation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1967), 26. On
that same day, Richmond voted in favor of the merger by a count of 15,051 to 6,700. Both black and mixed
voting districts rejected the merger, while ninety-six percent of white districts supported the merger. The
voting tallies show that neither urban blacks nor suburban whites wanted the merger. The history of Virginia’s
political conflict between cities and counties dates farther back into the late nineteenth century. City and
county leadership have a long history of not working together in mergers and annexations. Both black and
mixed voting districts rejected the merger, while ninety-six percent of white districts supported the merger.
The voting tallies show that neither urban blacks nor suburban whites wanted the merger.
50

47

Manager Edwards, requested 152 square miles and 115,000 residents from Henrico, as well
as 51 square miles from Chesterfield, which included more than 40,000 residents. Both
Henrico and Chesterfield populations were majority middle-class and at least 92% white.
Annexations were powerful. They had the potential to give Virginian cities larger
economies. However, they sparked long political battles between urban white elites and
suburban residents over the vitality of cities in metropolitian areas. Uniquely, Virginia was
and is the only state to have independent cities and counties. So cooperation between urban
and suburban leaders was key to achieve any mutually beneficial end. However, Henrico
and Chesterfield inspired Matthew Lassiter’s “Silent Majority” suburban analysis, in that
they used their social class to create an identity that separated them from politically allying
with elite whites on exclusively racial terms.51
Richmond newspapers promoted the annexations as a shared interest between urban
and suburban whites. The annexations were supposed to save, not just Richmond, but the
entire metropolitan area from the physical and economic urban decay seen in Detroit,
Newark, and Washington D.C. The Times-Dispatch warned county residents that
“Richmond must either expand or decline.” Only a “political union” between urban and
suburban whites will keep black leaders from the city council. “New opportunities for
community progress” only came if Richmond remained majority white. Although suburban

“Annexation Suit Time Predicted,” Richmond Times Dispatch, December 15, 1961; “Last City-County
Annexation,” Richmond News Leader, June 10, 1959; Population of Richmond, Henrico, and Chesterfield,
Virginia 1930-1975, U.S. Census Bureau; Richmond News Leader, January 1, 1962; and Lassiter, Silent
Majority, 120. Virginia is the only state with independent cities and counties. This was put into place after
the Civil War to ensure that shared municipal services did not cause political corruption or tie the economic
fate of one locality to its failing or thriving neighbor. Multiple ammendments were proposed to reverse this
system, yet the Byrd Machine ensured counties and cities maintained their independence. This city-county
structure is a staple of Virginia’s long history of conservative “pay as you go” politics, reducing the reliance
on federal or state financial aid. For more information, see Wilkerson, 285 and Andrew W. Sorrell and Bruce
A. Vlk, “Virginia’s Never-Ending Moratorium on City-County Annexations,” The Virgninia News Letter
(Vol 88 no.1) January 2012.
51

48

residents lived outside the city, most of their daily lives were spent downtown. The media
wished Henrico/Chesterfield leadership and residents understood that rejecting annexation
meant rendering Richmond to a dilapidated slum. Saving Richmond was as much
economic, as it was racial. In the eyes of the media and urban white leaders, class interest
should not render race and its economic implications useless.52
Media propaganda favoring annexation was as realistic as it was ideologically
driven. The Times-Dispatch contended that both counties could not provide municipal
services fitting a growing metropolitan area. Both counties could not provide ample
sewage, local employment, recreational services, postal services, public libraries,
museums, hospitals, electricity, and public schools to the spread out towns and sprawling
subdivisions located with their borders. The Times-Dispatch insisted that if suburbanites
reconnected with the city, public services would improve. Increased citizenry would “make
no substantial contribution to the cost of providing the municipal services and the
management and administrative function.” Although the Richmond media advertised how
the metropolitan area benefited from the annexation, county leaders and suburban residents
risked losing their political power. Independent counties were not politically tied to cities,
thus annexation permanently removed land and tax revenue from suburbna counties, with
little chance of future return. Therefore, suburban leadership were hesitant to negotiate
annexations with city officials.53
The Virginia Assembly’s legislative support ensured that Richmond’s annexation
suits would be heard. Both Henrico and Chesterfield Boards of Supervisors filed appeals
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for dismissal to the Virginia Supreme Court. State support for the city council ran deep, as
the Assembly passed legislation ensuring that any anti-annexation bill passed would not
impact the current suits with either county, regardless of the length of the outcome. “The
General Assembly was obsessed with maintaining racial segregation. In fact, that's all they
did” during the 1960s according to Moeser. The Assembly’s pro-annexation sentiment
caused both appeals to be denied almost immediately. As black Richmonders gained
political power in urban politics, keeping black leadership out of the city council became a
state interest. Blacks gaining political control of the capital city could bring about a regime
change to Virginia’s affluent white oligarchical power structure. Therefore, if Henrico and
Chesterfield's leadership wished to end annexation talks, they had to defeat city leaders in
court.54
Despite state support, the annexation court limited Richmond’s territorial growth.
On the eve of the 1964 councilmanic election, the city council lost its annexation battle
against Henrico. Richmond’s land proposals were “insufficient” and did not justify the
request for over fifty-one square miles from Henrico according to the annexation court.
Instead, the court awarded the city seventeen square miles and 45,000 residents, of which
99% were white. The seventeen square miles was the closest parcel of land to the city;
however, it was undeveloped and would cost 55 million dollars to purchase and even more
to develop for residential and commercial use. The rejection had political implications.
According to state law, a lost annexation suit prevented Richmond from attempting to
annex Henrico for the next five years. Adversely, accepting or deny the reward legitimized
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the annexation court’s ruling, closing the door on any future annexation of Henrico
County.55
The council used the Henrico misfortune to double-down on Chesterfield. After the
failed annexation appeal in Henrico, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the annexation
ruling on January 20, 1965. This forced city officials to either accept or decline the award.
Either way, Henrico could not be annexed for five years. Although former city councilmen
Wayland Rennie lamented that city officials made the wrong decision, the city council
declined the award. The decline was a gamble. Thinking that a 55 million dollar bill for
just seventeen square miles significantly hindered potential gains in the Chesterfield suit,
the council temporarily saved the city budget to fight Chesterfield officials in court. It was
clear that Richmond had to expand, yet the council’s refusal to take peanuts from Henrico
signified that Chesterfield suburbanites were facing an even hungrier and more aggressive
giant, who would not rest until its suburban neighbors cooperated.56
Both Richmond and Chesterfield County officials understood the racial
implications of the annexation suit. White flight, the failed 1961 merger, and the rejected
1964 Henrico annexation left Richmond with a fifty one percent white majority by January
1, 1965. Between February and October of 1965, Richmond lawyer Andrew J. Bent, Mayor
Morrill M. Crowe, and City Manager Horace Edwards conducted secret meetings with
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Chesterfield Board of Supervisors Chairman Irving G. Horner, and Chesterfield Board
Executive Secretary Melvin W. Burnett. The topic was Richmond’s territorial expansion,
however, the category was race. “It was common knowledge that the City of Richmond
was going black…we realized it… They claimed they had to have people from Chesterfield
to offset the growing black race in the city… This was the basis of their negotiations,”
according to Burnett. Richmond officials had a different perspective on the negotiations.
“You would have a right to say that race entered into it,” said Mayor Crowe during the
Curtis Holt Sr. City of Richmond case six years later. However, evidence suggest race
never entered a discussion because it was the discussion. Since both sides understood that
“the General Assembly will not allow the Capital City to be eternally thwarted in its efforts
to procure room to grow,” both urban and suburban leadership willingly negotiated a land
and citizen settlement according to News-Leader reporter Charles Houston. Suburban
leadership’s willingness to negotiate was not a willingness to settle because city officials
had a track record of losing annexation suits.57
City officials went 0 for 2 against its suburban neighbors. Although both sides
understood the racial implications of not annexing, constituency interest prevented an outof-court settlement. Chesterfield leadership, headed by Board Supervisor Irvin Horner,
refused to relinquish 45,000 white citizens and ¾ of Northern Chesterfield to Mayor Crowe
and City Manager Edwards. Suburban leadership was only willing to help Richmond’s
white elite if the suburbs were not annexed in the near future. Because city officials refused
to relinquish future annexation rights against Chesterfield, the case went to trial. On
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November 27, 1965, Judge William Old of Chesterfield County and Judge Vincent L.
Sexton Jr. of Bluefield County voted to dismiss the case 2 to 1 over Judge Elliot Marshall
of Front Royal. This time, there was no award from the court. This left Richmond at the
mercy of the state, so Richmond officials appealed, leaving the city’s racial fate up to the
1966 General Assembly.58
Richmond officials’ inability to racially dilute the state capital ignited the General
Assembly to intervene in the annexation crisis. Because, as Virginia Delegate T. Coleman
Andrews Jr. stated, “antiquated annexation laws,” deterred “the logical expansion of
Virginia’s cities,” the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the annexation case and ensured
it was “stricken from the court docket.” Since Richmond never officially lost the
annexation case, city officials could resume the suit the following year. Maintaining
Richmond’s white majority was just as much a state interest, as it was an urban interest.
Richmond’s racial transition “worried the General Assembly,” as they became as obsessed
with annexation as Richmond’s white leadership according to author Benjamin Campbell.
The General Assembly issued a Blue Ribbon Commission, on April 4, 1966, that provided
Assembly members with a “feasible” plan for annexation. Although the Commission did
not report its findings until 1967, the state made it clear that city officials’ inability to
control Civil Rights changes threatened more than the metropolitan area. Never before had
the former Confederate capital been unable to control the population and political growth
of its black residents. If Civil Rights changes allowed blacks to politically control the state
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capital, this trend could spread to other majority black Virginian cities. White fear of racial
uncertainty was very real and it penetrated even the highest forms of political power.59
White fears surrounding annexation heightened after the 1966 election. Only a
week after three black councilmen won city council seats, the six white councilmen secretly
negotiated with Chesterfield’s Board of Supervisors over territorial expansion. If “present
political trends continue in Richmond,” forwarned the Norfolk-Virginia Pilot, “[black]
voters will grow steadily stronger, and within a very few years they may be able to elect a
majority of Richmond’s nine councilmen.” Councilman James Wheat asked Chesterfield
Board Member Irvin Horner for “44,000 affluent white people,” to offset the city’s 50%
black population. These fears even penetrated the protected Henrico County. “There’s no
sense in kidding ourselves,” said one anonymous Henrico official in the Times-Dispatch
article “Vote May Spur Merger Attempt.” Annexation talks between Chesterfield and
Richmond officials “would indicate to anyone that it is the result of the large Negro vote.”
Although neither side ceded to the other on their terms for annexation, it became blatantly
obvious that Richmond’s six-year racial transition from a majority white to a racially split
city destabilized metropolitan politics going into 1967.60
Conclusion
Richmond was not the same city in 1966 as it was in 1960. The city went from a
white majority city with a segregated school system and all-white city council to a racially
split population, integrated schools, and three black councilmen. This rapid change brought
Richmond closer to a racial shift in the city’s power structure. The question is “what
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inspired this drastic racial transition?” Civil Rights Era advances and the destabilization of
Jim Crow brought about the beginning of this complicated saga. Councilmanic politics,
school desegregation, and annexation only amplified the foreign political terrain urban
blacks, affluent whites, and suburbanites had to navigate. Just as urban blacks used
unfamiliar (Civil Rights legislation) tactics to alter the political landscape of a Jim Crow
city, affluent whites reciprocated with an annexation deal with suburban leadership. This,
along with Henry Marsh III’s campaign against urban redevelopment and Judge Robert
Merhige’s school consolidation, added to Richmond’s Civil Rights Era political instability.
Furthermore, as 1967 approached, race and class differences heightened, further
complicating Richmond’s shift from a white to a black majority city.
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Chapter 2: 1967-1970 The Middle Years
The years between 1960 and 1966 characterized black Civil Rights Era gains;
however, the four years between 1967 and 1970 highlight the repeal of those gains. The
city began 1967 with a 50/50 white-black population, however, it ended 1970 with a 58%
white majority. The reversal in Richmond’s racial shift came from five major events: Henry
Marsh III’s fight against urban redevelopment, the 1968 city council election, the 1969
annexation, the 1970 city council election, and the 1970 busing scheme. These five events
prevented the former Confederate capital and its city council from becoming majority black
at the twilight of the Civil Rights Era. However, the annexation quick-fix set the stage for
black and white class conflict ultimately resulting in federal involvement through two
landmark lawsuits: Bradley v. Richmond School Board and Holt v. City of Richmond,
Virginia. The results of these post-1970 cases completed Richmond’s power shift as the
city received its majority black councilmanic leadership.
Urban Redevelopment
Previous electoral gains allowed black leadership to challenge white leaders on the
Richmond’s most controversial issue: urban redevelopment. White city councilmen,
headed by Phil Bagley, devised urban redevelopment strategies that replaced almost 10,000
black residents from the city’s core with new expressways to the suburbs. Councilman
Henry Marsh III, along with the black working-class, fought the redevelopment strategy
throughout Marsh’s first two terms. White city leaders sequestered support from suburban
leadership; however, suburban class interest prevented any urban-suburban white coalition
sidestepping Marsh’s anti-redevelopment agenda. Marsh successful opposition prevented
working-class neighborhoods from turning into mall parking lots. Without Marsh’s
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successful opposition, the 1967 redevelopment strategy would have mirrored the I-95
project. White leadership’s inability to redevelop Richmond not only made the 1968
election the most important election in city history, it ensured annexation as the only
measure to continue white leadership over a white majority Richmond.
Between 1967 and 1970, urban white leadership attempted to physically redevelop
Richmond for the second time. Like the I-95 project, this slum clearance plan would “take
poor people, Negro people from their homes and property and let them vegetate for the rest
of their lives in cinder block [public] housing,” according Councilman Howard Carwile.
With physical decay and decreased tax revenue, the city council assigned the Richmond
Redevelopment Housing Authority (RRHA) and the Richmond Metropolitan Authority
(RMA) to “construct a downtown expressway linking the city’s core with mushrooming
suburbs to the southwest.” This strategy provided Chesterfield residents with immediate
access to the inner city, while creating physical barriers between East End housing projects
and “middle-class white neighborhoods to the West” End. Later called “The City’s Biggest
Disgrace” by historian Christopher Silver, this plan would have alleviated the housing
displacement that I-95 started in 1957. Blacks would have been residentially relocated from
the city’s core, leaving it open for white businesses and Virginia Commonwealth
University expansion.61
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Henry Marsh III allied with white liberal Howard Carwile to challenge urban
redevelopment. The first RMA and RRHA plans were to demolish Idlewood and Fulton.
Both neighborhoods had “cracked and crumbling houses,” and many within white
leadership thought these were “the worst section[s] of the city;” making both “sites for light
industry” and redevelopment said former Councilwoman Eleanor P. Sheppard in TimesDispatch interview. Fulton’s redevelopment would have displaced more than 2,400
homeowners from “their humble hovels” and threw them into “racial ghettoes… [for] the
remainder of their natural lives.” So Carwile mobilized Fulton residents, into the Fulton
Improvement Association (FIA), which drew its own rehabilitation plans that “allow[ed]
homeowners to keep their homes.” After two years of FIA and city council negotiations,
the Fulton neighborhood was partial rehabilitated and not completely redeveloped. As for
Marsh and Idlewood, redevelopment would have displaced over 900 black working-class
families. Marsh wanted to “delay the execution…on the Idlewood corridor,” so he asked
and received a stay on the project. This delay along with Carwile’s Fulton situation not
only froze over two million dollars’ worth of federal and local funding, it created tensions
within the city council.62
Marsh’s opposition to urban redevelopment created a rivalry between himself and
Councilman Phil Bagley. During council meetings about redevelopment, both Marsh and
Bagley headed their respective constituencies. Bagley represented urban white business
elites while Marsh represented potentially displaced blacks. Marsh went on record saying
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that Bagley and Richmond Forward’s (RF) support of redevelopment “jeopardize[ed]
efforts to provide more housing in the city.” There were “human problems involved in the
displacement of persons.” To Bagley, Marsh was turning redevelopment into “political
capital,” using it to exploit the displacement aspect of redevelopment to maintain workingclass constituency throughout the city. Black political gains allowed Marsh III to oppose
white leadership in ways former black councilmen Oliver Hill and B.A. Cephas could not.
His opposition to Bagley, the face of urban redevelopment, encouraged working-class
black residents voicing their dissatisfaction with white leaders.63
Black Richmonders resisted redevelopment plans for Jackson Ward. Marsh’s
Idlewood opposition was defeated in the council 5-4 in late November 1966. With this slim
victory, white councilmen proposed another expressway plan through Jackson Ward, as
the residential rate suffered from the aftermath of I-95. Members of the City Housing
Committee Winfred Mundle, B.A. Cephas, and James Wheat were tasked with
consolidating displaced blacks in the city’s East End housing projects. Harold H. Bradley,
head of Jackson Ward’s voting district, organized sixty residents in a “boycott of
downtown merchants as a means of forcing a rerouting of the downtown corridor…the $95
million expressway is being built for downtown [business] interest” at the expense of
working-class black homeowners said, Bradley. Since downtown businesses benefited
from the expressway, according to Bradley, “we are going to leave downtown Richmond
alone for a little while…and see how they get along.” Likewise, Reverend E.E. Smith
encouraged blacks to boycott downtown businesses and “battle Richmond Forward at the
polls” if Jackson Ward was to be redeveloped. 64
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Black Richmonders increased their mobilized efforts to save Jackson Ward. Black
residents “packed the council chambers” on the warm spring night of April 25, 1967,
hoping to convince the five pro-redevelopment council members to reconsider the urban
renewal plans. “Do not displace our neighborhood; do not put the people out of their houses
who have no place to go…do not displace our people,” exclaimed neighborhood
representative Henry Clarke. Councilman Howard Carwile supported the cause by
criticizing what he called “Jim Crow housing proposals.” After the emotional pleas
convinced the pro-redevelopment sector of the council to reject the expressway plan,
Carwile congratulated black residents “for initiating demonstrations against the
expressway.” Black neighborhood activism, electoral gains, and councilmanic leadership,
prevented white leadership from displacing black residents. Black redevelopment
opposition forced white leaders to sequester support from suburban leadership to relocate
blacks from the city’s core by investing “more than $1 million in South Richmond” for
public housing.65
White leadership ran into suburban opposition while trying to relocate blacks from
the city’s core to South Richmond. With core redevelopment temporarily suspended, the
city council proposed public housing construction near the Richmond-Chesterfield border.
Support from suburban leadership would have ensured the project, given that Chesterfield
property values were directly affected by the construction taking place on its border.
However, suburban leader Chesterfield Board of Supervisors Member Frederick T. Grey
opposed the construction when city councilmen approached the Board during January of
1968. According to Grey, suburbanites only supported “luxury-type apartment buildings”
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near their border, not low-income housing projects. Grey made it very clear that urban
political problems should stay within city borders. Housing projects, according to Grey,
caused a huge “disturbance of a stable community…let’s not overcrowd South Richmond,
let us not build ourselves a ghetto;” was the sentment Grey represented in his objection.
Grey’s objection caused the city council to veto its own proposed measure. The fear of
black neighbors, along with Richmond’s political drama sitting on suburban borders,
prevented suburban leadership from helping the city council with the redevelopment
problem that Marsh, Carwile, and the working-class blacks created within the city.66
As redevelopment woes intensified, black leadership, headed by Marsh,
rehabilitated Richmond’s East End. The city was, by 1969, forty square miles, yet it had
the sixth most concentrated public housing tract in America. East End was five percent of
Richmond’s land mass and held more than fifty percent of its poverty. “When I think of
Church Hill,” a black East End neighborhood, “I think of the people who need many more
services from the city than they are getting,” said Marsh. As he pushed for housing codes
that protected black neighborhoods from dilapidation and redevelopment, black
councilmen B.A. Cephas and Vice Mayor Winfred Mundle supported Marsh’s campaign.
“The level of frustration and hopelessness is growing rapidly in the city,” as white leaders
opposed Marsh III in every way. To Councilman Bagley, Richmond was a “77 million
dollar cooperation.” The only problem was that Marsh’s rehabilitation plan ensured “this
corporation spends 77 million,” guaranteeing “it doesn’t earn it” back. Black leaders fought
redevelopment plans until the council applied for and received a $450,000 federal housing
grant. The grant went exclusively to “making Church Hill a model neighborhood” for
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rehabilitation, not redevelopment. This plan, along with their collective support against
urban renewal, allowed Richmond blacks “to participate in planning their own future,” one
that excluded white leadership from disenfranchising blacks through urban space.67
Before Marsh’s rookie term, black Richmonders never successfully opposed urban
redevelopment. The black working class, led by Henry Marsh, had more say in urban
politics. Marsh was the third post-Reconstruction black councilman, yet he was the most
aggressive in shaping urban policy. Oliver Hill in 1948 and B.A. Cephas in 1964 had
neither the Civil Rights Era circumstances nor the electorate to become serious forces in
urban affairs. The mobilization against urban redevelopment and black increases in
electoral politics allowed Marsh to aggressively battle white leadership, whereas Oliver
Hill and B.A. Cephas could not. Marsh’s first two terms illuminated the transition from
urban blacks having electoral power to possessing councilmanic power. Richmond’s racial
dynamic, and Marsh’s ability to capitalize on it, set the stage for Richmond’s most
important election in city history.
1968 Election
The 1968 election was the most polarized election of Richmond’s seventeen-year
power shift. White leaders used the local media to secure the city council in the 1968
election. White leadership used racial fears to remind whites of the possibility of black
leadership controlling the city. The same white leadership used race to convince workingclass blacks that their professionals were no more than slum lords, using race to secure
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political power through racialized voting solidarity. The results of this election reassured
white leadership that annexation was the only solution to prevent black leadership from
controlling City Hall. In the end, the election results not only produced the 1969
annexation, it became the lynchpin of the 1970 busing crisis.
This election experienced more voter participation and media attention than ever
before. By late May, the Crusade helped increase black voter registration by ten percent
from 1966, increasing the black vote to forty-four percent of the anticipated turnout. These
numbers confirmed white fears that this election was going to deliver a black majority city
council. In response, the affluent white voter organization Richmond Forward revitalized
voting registration in white districts. Using public schools and community centers,
Richmond Forward helped intensify white voter registration. The goal was to increase
white voter turnout from thrity percenty to eighty percent of the overall white population.
The News Leader tracked Richmond Forward’s campaigning and noted that “the
R[ichmond] F[orward] efforts have been intensified…since the circulation began in the
Negro community two weeks ago” that blacks could take the city council. Richmond
Forward and Crusade efforts were so visible that they reached “proportions seldom, if ever,
undertaken in a Richmond political campaign” Both white and black leaders understood
that whichever side best mobilized its base would win a majority on the council.68
The white media used coded race language to secure biracial support against black
Crusade candidates. Election Day was “one of the most important days in the history of
Richmond,” according to the Times-Dispatch. If Richmond was to remain an “AllAmerican City,” its voters would have to ensure the “irresponsible and inexperienced”
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Crusade candidates were not elected. To the News-Leader, if Crusade candidates won,
“Richmond will become a permanent black ghetto, a happy hunting ground for ambitious
political opportunists.” Both media outlets portrayed Crusade leaders as urban slum lords,
using social change to place themselves at the helm of urban politics. The Crusade was
running a “cruel hoax on the disadvantaged citizens of” Richmond,” using race leadership
to garner political power in the increasingly black city. To hide the racial coding with
economics, the News Leader concluded by alarming white and black voters that “the
normal exodus to the suburbs will accelerate…leav[ing] a lower tax base for the
disadvantaged in a time of increased need,” if black leaders becomes the councilmanic
majority.69
The black media used race and class to combat the white media’s criticism of black
leadership. The Richmond Afro-American, a known Crusade mouthpiece, responded to the
News Leader slum lord claims by reminding Richmonders that the Crusade represented the
poor it did not exploit them. While adopting Martin Luther King’s Poor Peoples Ticket,
championing economic rights through jobs and housing for working-class blacks, the AfroAmerican illuminated Richmonf Forward’s ties with white business interest. “Richmond
Forward [is] backed and controlled by the city’s big money czars.”
The Afro-American went on to say that Richmond Forward:
“Has been so devoted to pushing its individual and corporate pursuits that it has
grossly neglected the needs of the people, particularly the city’s working man and
disadvantaged. RF record would have been impressive in the 40’s. But this is 1968 when
identity with ‘safe’ colored folk, interracial cocktail parties and mushy smiles by the mayor
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don’t get it. Today, what is needed is men with guts to take effective action to eradicate
racism and injustices which are about to destroy not only Richmond but the
country…Richmond Forward has been unwilling to act against oppression…the record
shows that it has sometimes tended to promote it. All one needs to do is recall Richmond
Forward’s race baiting tactics on open housing and annexation.”70
Richmond Forward selected its candidates with the growing black working-class
voting base in mind. While supporting eight candidates, Richmond Forward left one spot
open for Richmond’s favorite councilman: Henry Marsh. Richmond Forward implemented
the eight-man nomination strategy to ensure the two voting blocs they needed to win:
whites and working-class blacks. Richmond Forward could not endorse Marsh because
conservative and business friendly whites hated his opposition to urban redevelopment.
However, Marsh had a strong white liberal following in the city’s Southside. This was in
part to Marsh being the “the only black guy they heard of,” as well as his strong ties to the
liberal faction of the Democratic Party. Marsh’s rookie term provided him much support
city-wide, making a direct campaign for or against him political suicide for Richmond
Forward.71
The Crusade’s candidate selection process reflected its stance against white
business interests, along with fears of white voter backlash. The Crusade shifted away from
a heavy black slate, in favor of a bi-racial slate. Questions about supporting blacks who did
not fit the agenda led to the Crusade removing support from incumbent black councilmen
B.A. Cephas and Winfred Mundle. Both Cephas and Mundle not only supported urban
redevelopment, they served on housing committees that refused to provide adequate
housing for black residents. Traditionally seen as go-betweens for white and black leaders,
Cephas and Mundle’s fates were sealed without Crusade support. Their political success
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centered on being the black faces of white politicians. Without black support, white
politicians had no use for Cephas and Mundle in the council. For the Crusade, rejecting
Cephas and Mundle, as historian Allan Hammock suggested, proved “blacks could reject
black candidates who were well-known incumbents and vote for Crusade endorsed white
candidates,” two being Reverend James Carpenter and Howard Carwile. Moreover, it
legitimized their claim to work for the poor, given that white and black poverty plagued
Richmond. Black professionals ensured that their political ascension appeared as socially
centered ideals involving race and not race based social change. Therefore, liberal whites
replaced conservative blacks on the Crusade ticket.72
The highly anticipated 1968 election did not bring about the results the white media
predicted. On Election Day, July 14, 1968, Richmond did not have anything close to a
majority black city council. Henry Marsh was the only one of the three incumbent black
councilmen to win reelection. This had much to do with Richmond Forward not
campaigning against him, Crusade support for him, and his increased popularity amongst
white liberals. The white liberal presence was felt more by the return of Howard Carwile
to the council, winning first place with over fifty-six percent of the electorate. Marsh and
Carwile were accompanied by a white Reverend of a black church James Carpenter.73
The white media wrongly assessed the implications of the election results. The
News Leader assured white residents that Crusade electoral advances were coming to an
end because two of the three black incumbents lost their reelection bids. While focusing
on race, the News Leader neglected to mention that Cephas and Mundle were elected out
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of office by the same urban blacks who elected them in 1966. Even the Times-Dispatch
post-election report suggested that Cephas and Mundle’s support of urban redevelopment
cost them black support. Rather, Marsh had two allies, Carwile and Carpenter, who were
going to vote his way on almost every measure. This was actually the Crusade’s strongest
election to date. Black leadership secured three seats for councilmen, guaranteed white
liberal voters, and had three councilmen who were solely interested in opposing elite white
councilmanic interests.74
While the 1968 election featured less black councilmen than the 1966 election,
urban blacks possessed more electoral power than in years past. Black leadership, through
its bi-racial slate, helped elect enough councilmen to stop proposals by Richmond Forward
councilmen, giving black leadership its first ever veto power in the city council. Although
the Times-Dispatch reported the removal of two black incumbents as “the death of the
Richmond Crusade for Voters as a major power in the city political structure,” black
leadership once again increased its political power through electoral gains. The realization
of what the Crusade accomplished in the 1968 election forced white leaders to broker a
land and citizen deal with suburban leadership, hoping to thwart the increasing professional
black influence in city politics.75
1969 Annexation
The 1969 annexation culminated the efforts of urban and suburban white leaders
using their various political agendas to ensure Richmond and its city council remained
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white. Once completed, the annexation made 44,000 white Chesterfield suburbanites
Richmond residents at the stroke of midnight on January 1, 1970. This acquisition had
social and political ramifications. Socially, the annexation sparked suburban unrest, as
newly-made Richmond residents opposed their new residential status through petitions to
the Virginia Supreme Court. Suburban unrest was followed by urban unrest between law
enforcement and black residents, who were the new voting minority. Politically,
annexation reduced Richmond’s black citizenry from fifty-two percent to forty-two
percent , ensuring a white majority city council in the 1970 election. Disdain over the racial
results of the 1969 annexation, as well as the city council it created afterward, played out
in education reform, leading to the final stage of Richmond’s racial shift in 1977.
Urban white leaders made efforts to work with suburban leaders on annexation.
City Manager Alan Kiepper and Chesterfield Board Member Melvin Burnett met eight
times between July 16 and September 12, 1968. Despite Kiepper asking for “50,000
affluent white” people to offset the growing black populace, the subject of the meeting was
not as important as the places they met. Burnett and Kiepper met in donut shops, houses of
mutual friends, and small diners, all located in what would be the annexed territory. These
locations suggest a shifting class relationship between urban and suburban white
leadership. Traditionally, urban white leadership conducted business in venues like the
Country Club of Virginia, which excluded blacks and non-elite whites. However, urban
leaders stepping away from the traditional haven for racial politics illuminated how
important it was that suburban leadership worked with them to make, according to John
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Moeser, the “one mind” they both shared into a reality. That reality was the assurance that
blacks did not control the urban center of the metropolitan area. 76
Negotiations became complicated when more city and county officials entered the
discussion. Kiepper and Burnett could not reach a compromise because both sides refused
to compromise on the number of annexed residents. So, Richmond Mayor Phil J. Bagley
and Chesterfield Board Member Frederick F. Dietsch entered the annexation discussions.
Both Dietsch and Bagley represented the extremes of suburban and urban leadership. To
Dietsch, any annexation of over 30,000 residents “was out of the question.” If
Chesterfield’s leadership would cede Richmond the 50,000 white residents the council
wanted, “the court would have to order it.” Mayor Phil Bagley was determined to annex
50,000 white suburbanites to prevent “the city from going to the niggers,” politically and
demographically. Bagley foreshadowed the future annexation by proclaiming that “as long
as I am the Mayor of the City of Richmond, the niggers won’t take over this
town…[because] niggers are not qualified to run the city.” Dietsch’s and Bagley’s stances
only complicated discussions between the two sides, forcing the state’s hand in doing what
they both could not: maintain a white majority in Richmond.77
Fed up with the annexation stalemate, state powers intervened to force an urbansuburban solution. The annexation trial resumed on September 24, 1968, with both sides
farther away from a solution. After Chesterfield Attorney Frederick T. Grey and Richmond
Planning Director A. Howe Todd finished 1968 in a stalemated court battle, Governor Mills
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E. Godwin called a special General Assembly session in April of 1969. In this special
session, the Assembly proposed and passed an amendment to expand city borders to the
Assembly’s liking in any direction it saw fit, effective January 1, 1970. The bill was only
voided if a land deal was brokered before the January 1 deadline. Godwin’s measure took
political power away from both urban and suburban leaders. Now the state decided if and
how Richmond should grow, as well as Chesterfield’s sociopolitical aftermath.78
Suburban leadership was convinced Godwin’s bill was a racially motivated
measure to maintain white leadership in Richmond. The General Assembly, as well as “the
City of Richmond is only interested in one thing, white votes,” said Chesterfield Delegate
George Jones. Instead of the state handling Richmond’s affairs, Jones argued suburbanites
should “appoint the city council if they cannot manage the City of Richmond and they need
help from us.” Jones finished his speech on the House floor by mentioning “there is a group
in Richmond that would like to continue the stranglehold control that they have over the
city.” This group was the city’s affluent white class, and its stranglehold was reassured
through “keep[ing] more registered white voters than Negro voters.” Despite stating the
obvious, Governor Godwin, with Assembly members, put both Richmond and Chesterfield
leadership on notice that either they ensure Richmond remained white or the state would
do it for them.79
Urban and suburban leadership responded to Godwin’s bill by settling on the city’s
territorial expansion. On May 15, 1969, Mayor Phil Bagley and County Board Member
Irvin Horner met and agreed to Chesterfield relinquishing twenty-three square miles of its
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northeast border to Richmond, which included 44,000 residents (43,781 white), for $34
million. Despite dissenting votes from Richmond’s Henry Marsh III, Howard Carwile,
James Carpenter, and two Chesterfield Board Members, both groups agreed to what would
be called the Horner-Bagley line. This agreement ensured that the annexation was effective
on January 1, 1970, nullifying the General Assembly’s annexation amendment.80
Black opposition to the effects of annexation came in the form of welfare protest.
The annexation price put public programs under financial strain. The city charter forbade
the council from borrowing money to annex land, therefore, the $34 million came directly
out of the city budget. One of the departments impacted most by city-wide cutbacks was
the welfare office. On October 1, 1969, the city enacted its welfare department budget cut,
which was planned almost a year prior to accommodate a future annexation purchase.
Included in the budget cut was the council’s vote to “not increase welfare payments for
clothes, food, and furniture,” all of which became more expensive as downtown businesses
relocated to the suburbs. The budget cut not only slashed entitlement payment almost in
half, it reduced the number of residents who could enroll and stay on the program. With
annexation, “the city bank account was under a strain,” forcing the council to save money
wherever they could.81
Black residents contested the council’s handling of welfare within the city budget.
After being told by Welfare Chief Herbert G. Ross that the council’s “instructions were to
cut costs in his department by $1 million…and that he could not accede to another
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demand,” black mothers, led by Miss Louretta Johnson and the National Welfare Rights
Organization, gathered outside of City Hall and the Safety, Health, and Welfare office in
protest. That night, black residents “packed out” the city council meeting over the welfare
issue. “Uniformed and plain clothes policemen stood to enforce Mayor Phil Bagley’s rule
against applause,” as tensions were high between black residents and white leaders. After
councilmen Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter requested putting city welfare program under
federal compliance for grant purposes was denied by all six Richmond Forward
councilmen, loud “rumbles of discontent” sprang “from the predominantly Negro crowd.”
One spectator encouraged Mayor Bagley to “sleep well,” knowing his administration was
arguably the most disfavored by black Richmonders in city history. Black discontent with
white leadership spilled out of City Hall and into the community, as law enforcement had
trouble policing black Richmond.82
Negative police-black encounters following the annexation reflected annexation
hostility between urban blacks and white leaders. Reports of violent encounters between
white police officers and black citizens became more frequent as the January 1, deadline
approached. One hundred and twenty black Richmonders went to City Hall in late October
to support twenty-one blacks who testified against the Richmond Police Department.
Residents used an incident, in which a black man was detained by white officers for no
legal reason, as a forum to publicize their complaints. Citizens claimed the police regularly
displayed “discourtesy, indifference” to “pickpocketing money from them.” White officers
responded to urban black complaints with violent threats. Statements like “I’ll blow your
brains out” reminded blacks that questioning the large police precence in their
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neighborhood could be fatal. Councilman Carwile believed this trend was a “city problem,”
as complaints dominated city council discussions. “A big handle of red-necked,
unreconstructed Dixiecrats and bigots” consistently punished anyone from the “majority
community,” who would become the minority soon enough. The excessive police force
appeared to be a physical reminder that whites were taking their city back on January 1,
1970. “The atmosphere is so built up” from the annexation that it was very difficult for
“the victim of police brutality to have anybody on their side.”83
White leadership minimized the obvious community-council problems that arose
from the annexation. City manager Alan Kiepper addressed Carwile and urban blacks by
proposing an increase in police patrol over black neighborhoods. Carwile’s “civilian police
review” board request “discredit[ed] the police,” according to City Manager Kiepper. City
Manager Alan Kiepper begged the council to release funds for police overtime hours. Since
Richmond’s street crime “mostly involves blacks,” increased patrol made sense, as policeblack encounters worsened. The measure was passed with three dissenting votes from the
usual suspects, Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter. This increased surveillance ensured that
newly annexed Chesterfield suburbanites felt safe knowing that black neighborhoods were
“properly” patrolled and controlled by white law enforcement. White control extended to
law enforcement, as black residents continued to show discontent over the recent
annexation decision.84
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Like working-class blacks, the annexation caused suburbanites much discomfort.
Chesterfield residents petitioned to appeal the annexation, as it was a point of dissension
between suburban residents and their leadership. While suburban leaders were interested
in maintaining Richmond’s white majority, the truth is most suburbanites could not care
less because real estate markets and county lines protected them from Civil Rights Era race
problems. Chesterfield residents, under the leadership of dissenting Board Member L. Paul
Byrne, encouraged Crusade president Wilmer Wilson, to sue the city council for violating
Section V of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), given that the annexation switched the
black voting majority to a minority. Black leaders refused to support any litigation based
on the VRA because the white influx stabilized the urban economy. After receiving no
support from Richmond’s black leadership, Chesterfield residents petitioned the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals on their own. The appeal was heard on November 20, 1969,
and cartupuled the annexation. Chesterfield residents filed one more appeal on December
19, 1969, but the Virginia Supreme Court rejected it once again. As the year 1969 drew to
a close, it was clear that the annexed residents were going to be Richmond residents on
January 1, 1970.85
The 1969 annexation allowed white city planners to temporarily control black Civil
Rights Era gains in electoral politics and urban policy. Marsh and Carwile’s urban
redevelopment opposition, along with the 1968 election, confirmed that urban and
suburban leaders needed to control the political destabilization caused by the breakdown
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of Jim Crow. Although Richmond and Chesterfield experienced backlash over the
annexation, its true effects would be felt in the 1970 election and the subsequent school
desegregation crisis.
1970 Election
The 1969 North Chesterfield annexation, which took effect on January 1, 1970,
complicated urban politics. Overnight, Richmond not only expanded its southwestern
border by twenty-three square miles, its white population increased from 108,398 to
143,857, now fifty-two pecent. Although white politicians saw the annexation as the means
to retain urban political power, the annexed residents had different political objectives,
making them a wild card in the 1970 election. White elites, black elites, and annexed
suburban leaders, all had interconnected interests that complicated their political dealing
with each other. Despite establishing their own political platform, the annexed suburban
electorate largely aligned with Richmond’s white leadership. However, the results of this
election created conflict in the school desegregation saga, which amplified when annexed
suburbanites came face-to-face with the Civil Rights Era changes Chesterfield County
previously protected them from, which was school desegregation.86
The annexed citizens wasted no time in politically mobilizing for the 1970
councilmanic election. Instead of supporting Richmond Forward, suburbanites formed
their own political organization called the Team of Progress (TOP). Under the leadership
of George Jones and Robert Tuttle, both of whom represented Chesterfield in the Virginia
House Delegates and were in the unique position of competing within urban politics for
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the first time, the TOP began 1970 by seeking alliances, hoping to get an upper hand on
Richmond’s established white and black political power structures.87
Suburban leadership’s first round of negotiations began with the possibility of a
biracial political alliance. On January 23 1970, TOP members Robert T. Fitzgerald, Roger
Griffin, and Ronald Livingston, met with Crusade founder Dr. William Thornton about
forming a political coalition in the upcoming election. The proposed alliance would
combine the newly annexed white and urban black voting minorities. The coalition could
have possibly unseated annexation leaders like Councilman James Wheat Jr., Mayor Phil
Bagley, Councilman Thomas Bliley, Councilman Nathan Forb, Councilwoman Nell B.
Pusey, and Councilman Morrill Crowe. After a few hours of discussion, Dr. Thornton
rejected the alliance because he felt the Crusade would not “benefit from a formal alliance”
with the TOP. Some suspected the proposed alliance would reduced the role black
professionals had in electoral politics, given that “the Crusade…was seldom on equal
footing” with white leaders, even within the city council. This proposed alliance was not
about two powers coming together, but about one power (annexed leadership) attempting
to use the other power (black professionals) to establish themselves as urban political
figures.88
With no intentions of fighting a three-way electoral battle, TOP leaders sought an
alliance with Richmond Forward. After failing to see eye-to-eye with Dr. Thornton, TOP
leadership met with current Richmond Forward councilmen Nathan Forbes and Thomas
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Bliley, offering to electorally achieve what the annexation sought out do: to keep
Richmond’s city council majority white. “I don’t want to see Richmond become an allblack city…fear of the city going black relates very much to the present school crisis we
have,” said future councilman and RF candidate Henry L. Valentine to TOP leaders. After
various meetings, the TOP split into two factions. Those who felt Richmond Forward
intended to use annexed votes to retain power, while not excluding them from the economic
and race issues the city faced, formed Richmond United (RU). Others who saw Richmond
Forward as the only means of obtaining political influence joined the TOP/Richmond
Forward coalition under the TOP umbrella.89
This was the first election since 1962 that featured two white voter organizations
with conflicting electoral interests. RU represented suburban annexed whites who endorsed
any candidate that opposed the 1969 annexation. Its support ranged from Crusade
incumbents Henry Marsh III, James Carpenter, and Howard Carwile, to new candidates
like Robert Shiro and Oats McCullen. TOP encompassed two groups: suburban whites who
supported urban white leadership and wealthy whites from Richmond Forward. TOP
endorsed pro-annexation leadership like Thomas Bliley and Nathan Forb, as well as “the
new white guys” such as Metropolitan National Bank President William Daniel and real
estate developer and chemical engineer Dr. Wayland Rennie.90
The Crusade used the split white vote to nominate another biracial slate, while
introducing new working-class community leaders to the councilmanic platform. While
endorsing the incumbent trifecta of Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter, the Crusade nominated

89

Exhibit #33, Curtis Holt, Sr., v. City of Richmond. TOP also met with William Daniel, president of National
Bank. He was a huge political patron in the city and a supporter of the former Richmond Forward.
90
Interview with Wayland Rennie, July 17, 2015; and Richmond Times Dispatch, April 30 and April 12,
1970.

77

black working-class leaders like Walter T. Kenny and Curtis Holt. Postal worker and
national vice-president of the American Postal Workers Union, Kenny ran his campaign
on improving public schools and the black community’s involvement in urban politics.
Head of the Creighton Court Civic Association (voter registration), Curtis Holt was an East
End community organizer who worked with Crusade leadership throughout the 1960s to
keep their electoral connection with the working poor. Neither Kenny or Holt won council
seats, however Holt’s defeat germinated with the 1969 annexation to bring about 1977
majority black city council.91
The 1970 election proved that the diverse interests, derived from the 1969
annexation, prevented black and suburban leadership from gaining control over the city
council. TOP helped elect six of the nine councilmen with the fifty-eight percent white
majority. None of the annexed citizens’ candidates, as well as the Crusade’s working-class
black candidates, won a council seat. The Crusade and RU helped reelect the same three
councilmen in 1970 that the Crusade did alone in 1968: Carwile, Marsh, and Carpenter.
Despite “many whites in the newly annexed area show[ing] their resentment having been
acquired by the city” through not allying with Richmond Forward, they did not have nearly
enough votes to secure their own councilmanic majority. The RU-Crusade support for
Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter resonated in all three receiving the highest overall votes. If
a suburban white-urban black political partnership happened on January 23, 1970, the
annexed citizens and black leadership would have controlled the 1970 city council.
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However, RU and the Crusade’s inability to ally resulted in affluent whites securing a
sizable councilmanic majority once again, thanks in part to the 1969 annexation.92
The stunted urban black political growth set the stage for Richmond’s school
desegregation crisis. Annexed residents did not enter the city as neutral observers in
councilmanic politics or social life. Like urban blacks, annexed suburbanites had their own
vision of post-Jim Crow Richmond. Suburbanites wanted protective municipal separation
from the growing black population. Hence, they formed their own voter organization, only
supporting leaders who wished to de-annex them back into the suburbs. After losing their
bid for political influence, annexed suburbanites sought to make Civil Rights Era
Richmond difficult for white leaders to control. Suburban resistance to the annexation
culminated in their own form of “Massive Resistance” to school desegregation, which sped
up urban black ascendancy to the city council.
Busing
Prior to the 1970 busing decree, three events complicated the political drama caused
by Richmond’s unstable post-Jim Crow political environment. First, segregationist Judge
John Butzner stepped down, and was replaced with Judge Robert Merhige. Second, the
Supreme Court ruled Freedom of Choice, or de facto segregation, unconstitutional. Third,
the annexation of 1969 placed over 10,000 suburban white students within Richmond City
Public Schools. White suburban and black urban resistance to busing was a piece in the
metropolitan areas’ multifaceted relationship with race and space. The fulfillment of
Brown, by 1970, shattered the remnants of Richmond’s “Separate City” model. Judge
Merhige ensured Richmond’s generational physically segregated public school system
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ended. This Jim Crow breakdown caused upheaval, as neither majority (working-class
blacks and suburban whites) wished to participate in redefining their relationship to each
other through education reform. The educational drama between 1968 and 1970
complicated Richmond’s racial transition because annexed white dissenters fought school
desegregation with school re-segregation, forcing Judge Merhige to consolidate
metropolitan politics into a unitary body through its school system by 1971.
Judge Robert Mehrige’s history with forced integration all but guaranteed that
white and black students would be forcibly integrated. Federal Judge John Butzner, the
man who ruled Freedom of Choice constitutional, stepped down and was replaced with
Judge Robert Merhige in 1968. Because Judge Merhige spent much of 1967 and 1968
desegregating Southern Virginia school systems, most notably using busing and citycounty consolidation in Emporia City, many saw him as a liberal judge. However, unlike
some of his contemporaries, Merhige “was not one to be interested in deeply theoretical
notions about statutory interpretation or constitutional interpretation;” however he
encountered the law with “a sense of human dignity” according to law professor Mary Tate.
To law professor and former collegue Ron Bacigal, Merhige often saw “what was right and
was what the law as one in the same,” when it came to Civil Rights legislation. Therefore,
when Merhige enforced Brown through busing, he did so with the understanding that it
was not only lawful, but that it was also what he felt was morally right.93
The defeat of Freedom of Choice put Judge Robert Merhige into contact with
Richmond’s public schools. The last leg of legal de facto segregation died thirty miles
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southeast of Richmond. On May 15, 1968, the Supreme Court ruled all Freedom of Choice
plans to be in violation of Brown in the Green v. County School Board of New Kent case.
In New Kent County, similar to Richmond, the majority of whites and blacks used Freedom
of Choice to stay in segregated schools. Therefore, resident NAACP member Charles C.
Green used the County’s Freedom of Choice Plan to prove that its offspring, de facto
segregation, was in violation of Brown because it produced a racially identifiable school
system. Serving as the Federal Judge in Richmond, Judge Mehrige helped to create another
desegregation plan for city schools. Having earned an unfavorable reputation in the famous
Greenville County School consolidation, Judge Merhige received threatening,
sympathetic, and desperate letters from whites hoping he would not use busing or
consolidation to racially balance Richmond’s public schools.94
White Richmonders’ hate letters revealed their collective fear of Judge Merhige
removing yet another remnant of the city’s Jim Crow culture: racially segregated public
schools. Hate mail, later named “Kook Files,” often revolved around the harm of bi-racial
contact between white and black students. Most of the harm stemmed from sex. One
mother begged Judge Merhige to spare Richmond public school system from desegregation
because she feared “the type of Negro” children who came from parents who refused “to
get married” and “keep having children with every Dick and Jane that comes along.” The
white mother’s criticism of the black family structure and sexual promiscuity reflected her
deeply rooted notion of blacks being too uncivilized to share the same classrooms with
white students. Some whites took their dehumanizing sexual stereotypes to the extreme by
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calling black boys “wired-haired cannibals” who loved nothing more than to rape young
white women. Another parent went as far as to accuse Judge Merhige and his wife of
having sexual relations with “niggers.” While most letters warranted the name Kook Files,
some parents expressed general concern for their children’s wellbeing. One mother claimed
she was forced to pick up a second job to pay for private school because she feared her
children being mistreated by the black students who hated white people. Through these
letters and many more received by School Board President Virginia Crockford, white
Richmonders revealed their deeply rooted fears and hatred associated with the breakdown
of Jim Crow. These racial fears were tested when they were faced with forced integration.95
Seeing Freedom of Choice as the last leg of Richmond’s school segregation, the
local NAACP struck what looked like the final blow against school segregation: Bradley
v. Richmond School Board. The timing for this lawsuit was key to its longevity and impact.
Had this lawsuit been filed before 1968, chances are it would have not been as effective.
Not until after the annexation took place, which added over 10,000 white students to the
sixty-eight percent black school district, did the NAACP reopen the 1962 lawsuit on March
10, 1970. The appointment of Judge Merhige, the illegality of Freedom of Choice, and the
increased white student body, made the Bradley v. Richmond City School Board suit more
likely to achieve racial integration in public schools.96
Political issues made this version of Bradley more powerful than the 1962 suit. The
council’s white majority understood that they could not successfully fight integration any
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longer. The 1962 Bradley suit came before Freedom of Choice, when statewide tokenism
was at its strongest. The 1970 Bradley suit came during intensified political drama over the
annexation and the council’s inability to institute Freedom of Choice. Financially, the
council could not afford another lengthy fight against school desegregation. The over one
million dollars in legal debt from the annexation, and Crusade councilmen Marsh,
Carpenter, and Carwile blocking all council proposed measures to borrow money, kept the
city’s legal budget to a minimum. If public schools were to survive, they needed federal
funding which hinged upon federal compliance with desegregation. With city council
approval, the Richmond School Board asked the U.S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) to devise desegregation plans that not only brought the city in
compliance with Brown, but enable the Richmond Public School systems to receive much
needed federal funds.97
It was clear to Judge Merhige that ending school segregation meant breaking the
geographic barrier that sustained it: space. By the summer of 1970, the biggest obstacle
preventing Richmond public schools from federal compliance was segregated housing. So,
Judge Mehrige allowed the HEW and the Urban Team to present methods for school
desegregation. The Urban Team and HEW decided that Richmond’s public schools would
never be in compliance unless the white suburbs were forced to participate in a
metropolitan busing scheme. Public schools resided within neighborhood boundaries, most
of which were racially segregated. This made mobility the issue, as blacks who wished to
send their children to white schools could not access public or private transportation to
white neighborhoods. White families, even those who lived in predominantly black areas,
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refused to send their children to schools with predominately black students and black
faculty. To Merhige, the solution was simple. Removing spatial barriers meant utilizing
busing.98
Judge Merhige refused to accept any desegregation plan that did not fully utilize
mass transportation to break the spatial barrier Jim Crow created. Distance and cost both
factored into the equation. Most black residents lived in Richmond’s East End and
Northside. Urban whites lived in the West End and Southside of the city. This meant any
approved busing scheme had to be implemented across the sixty-three square mile city.
HEW’s desegregation proposal, Plan I, included busing in all neighborhoods except the
all-black East End and all-white suburban annexed Southside. Since Plan I left two huge
sectors of the city untouched, providing residential safe zones, Judge Merhige rejected Plan
I. Plan II, devised by the city council and school board, allowed for complete cross-town
busing of every neighborhood, yet it relied exclusively on federal funds. Judge Merhige
rejected Plan II because it levied no financial responsibly on the same city that blatantly
disobeyed the law. As a compromise, Judge Merhige accepted Plan III on August 7, 1970.
It was a temporary plan that bused mainly East End and Northside blacks to Southside
schools.99
Suburban whites felt victimized and protested what they felt was a violation of their
consumer rights. Annexed residents formed the Citizens Against Busing (CAB) coalition
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under the leadership of Chesterfield preacher John Book. CAB petitioned Governor
Linwood Holt to issue a state ordinance repealing Judge Merhige’s busing plan. However,
state and local support for busing was evident as Governor Holt and TOP councilman
Mayor Thomas J. Bliley, who both vehemently opposed busing, asked annexed citizens to
“obey the law and cooperate.” The CAB organized drive-ins around Capital Square and
Richmond Arena, protesting the “the combining of all races by force” in public schools.
Annexed residents’ victimization was best explained by one mother who mentioned that
“before I was occupied by the City of Richmond, I was relatively happy and had no serious
problems.” Suburbanites “flee to the suburbs and so avoid the problems” of the city. “The
Problems” being Jim Crow’s demise. CAB’s message was clear. Annexed suburbanites
wanted residential, political, and educational separation from Richmond’s white elites and
black residents. The annexation and Judge Merhige’s busing ruling violated their Civil
Rights Era agenda, making suburbanites “second-class citizens” to the same blacks who
were just a few years before, legally second-class citizens.100
Suburban protest turned into massive resistance at the beginning of the 1970-71
school year. On the first day of school, suburban parents illegally withheld over 5,000
children from Richmond’s Public Schools’ busing plan. Few white dissenters, mostly in
the West End, legally removed their children from Richmond Public Schools, like Judge
Merhige who reassigned his own son to preparatory school. As historian Matthew Lassiter
noted, the majority of white dissention came from the annexed Southside. Stories of
Southside families renting additional apartments and using fake addresses in Chesterfield
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and Henrico to avoid busing ran rampant throughout the local media. The protest impacted
Richmond Public Schools, as by November of 1970, the fifty-eight percent black student
majority expanded to seventy percent in half of a semester.101
Working-class blacks resisted citywide busing as well. Black Richmonders
withheld 800 children from public schools in defiance of the busing order. “We want
neighborhood schools the same as white folk” said black parent and News Leader reporter
Al Johnson. Black mother Mrs. Shirley Martin told the Wall Street Journal that black
Richmonders accepted busing, “but we don’t like it.” Mrs. Martin later raised the question
of “why can’t my kids go to school near my house?” Many of the busing assignments put
black students in white schools, instead of the other way around. Urban blacks did not want
their children “to be bused all over the place” to protect white students from going into
black neighborhood schools. Although the school board and the city council saw forced
busing as in “the mutual interest of the entire metropolitan area,” on this and the
annexation, urban blacks aligned with suburban whites in opposition. This working-class
black and suburban white resistance was bigger than race. Rather, as historian Robert Pratt
alluded to, their defiance highlighted a “natural fear of the unknown” world Civil Rights
Era changes were creating. The breakdown of Jim Crow scared the working-class black
and suburban white majority, forcing them to react in utter defiance.102
Because of white and black defiance, Judge Merhige consolidated Richmond’s
race-centered political crisis through education. By December of 1970, busing became
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socially and economically unfeasible. Judge Merhige’s busing order left a $600,000
transportation bill on the city budget, along with the outstanding legal fees from the
annexation trial. In light of the recent failure, the local NAACP, headed by Henry Marsh,
encouraged the Bradley plaintiffs to request a consolidated school system with Henrico
and Chesterfield County. Since Chesterfield and Henrico served as safe zones against
Judge Merhige’s busing order, including both localities in Bradley would bring about the
fullest execution of Brown. After the Bradley plaintiffs requested it on December 14, 1970,
the Richmond School Board and City Council asked that both Henrico and Chesterfield be
brought into the Bradley suit, which Judge Merhige granted..103
The aftermath of the busing failure, in light of the 1969 annexation, set the stage
for two federal court battles that entrenched the city’s sociopolitical stability throughout
the 1970s. Failed cross-town busing did not end Civil Rights Era changes in Richmond.
Rather, it encouraged Judge Merhige to further complicate Richmond’s political landscape.
Richmond’s past sins of delaying Brown haunted the newly annexed suburbanites, who
had no intentions of helping the Bradley plaintiffs bring about the fulfillment of Civil
Rights education reform. The educational battle encompassed the city’s overall political
battle about the outlook of Richmond as the racially separate city became destabilized.
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Conclusion
Black leadership’s 1960-66 political strength was minimized during the Middle
Years of 1967-70. However, urban white leadership’s thwarting of black political power
only complicated Richmond’s political landscape. The city’s racial transition originally
encompassed white and black leadership vying for control over post-Jim Crow Richmond.
After the 1969 annexation, Richmond’s political battle became the metropolitan areas’ war
over the racial and political outlook of the capital city. As annexed residents were dragged
into Richmond’s urban crisis, they maintained their own agenda of suburban separation
apart from white and black leadership. The final stage of this transition represented the end
of elite white control over city politics. Working-class black and suburban white attacks on
white leaders inevitably forced affluent whites to vacate any chance of preventing
Richmond from becoming a black city council.
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Chapter 3: The Beginning of the End 1971-1977
The final stage of Richmond’s Civil Rights Era racial transition happened between
1971 and 1977. The Bradley and Holt trials ended elite white control of the city council
and public education. During these years, elite white control of the city became more
susceptible to challenges from urban blacks and suburban whites. Every political group,
whether it be middle-class blacks, working-class blacks, or middle-class whites, had
varying interpretations for how Civil Rights Era Richmond should operate. Circumstances
created strange political bedfellows that ultimately eroded the political power away from
urban white leaders by the end of both Bradley in 1974 and Holt in 1977.104
Although Richmond received a black majority city council by 1977, black politics
were far from monolithic. Through Bradley and Holt, both working and middle-class black
leaders fought separate issues for separate reasons, bringing about a similar outcome: a
black-majority city, majority black council, and a black mayor. While black professionals
supported Bradley and school desegregation, working-class black leadership supported
Holt and de-annexation. Both black constituencies had their own visions for Civil Rights
Richmond, and their separate fights placed them at odds with each other, as suburban and
elite white interests used this black class breakdown for their own agendas as well.
Although the city was about “ninety percent divided,” in that “there were few social
organizations that were integrated,” social conflict over school desegregation and the 1969
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annexation integrated Richmond’s political environment so much that white elites followed
suburbanites by politically vacating Richmond by 1977, creating the black majority city.105
Bradley
Judge Merhige’s busing experiment furthered the city’s racial divide. By January
of 1971, just six months after city-wide busing was approved, the black public school
population rose to seventy percent after being lowered below sixy percent by the
annexation. White and black urban residents separately opposed integrated schools. Black
parents withheld their children from integrated schools, while white parents relocated to
the suburbs. An anonymous black women noted, in an interview with Robert Pratt, that by
Christmas of 1970, her West End neighborhood switched from 90% white to 90% black
once busing was approved in August of 1970. School Board president Virginia Crockford
mentioned that once Judge Merhige’s busing order was implemented, white families fled
the Richmond PTA’s and neighborhoods in “droves.” White flight ranged from black
students victimizing white children on school buses, to the disapproval of the school
board’s support for busing. The defiance, by both sides, illuminated that the majority of
Richmonders were not willing or ready to defy the Jim Crow culture they grew up in.106
The hypocrisy shown by black and white leadership may have fueled much of the
defiance to busing. Despite Governor Linwood Holton sending his children to desegregated
public schools, some black and white professionals, with the financial means, sent their
children to private schools the minute busing was adopted. “The upper-class black kids left
instantly when those children came in,” according to former Councilman Wayland Rennie.
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“Even the Urban League president [Randolph C. Kendell] sent his children to private
school “the minute those children came in.” Those children being “the [black] children
from the [East End] housing projects.” Although some white Richmonders “wished [they]
had a realistic sense to do it,” before busing took place, many within white leadership
enrolled their children in private school afterward. Most white councilmen sent their
children to private schools while working almost every day on peacefully implementing
public school integration. This hypocrisy did not go unquestioned as Judge Merhige had to
answer to the public about sending his son, Mark Merhige, to St. Christopher’s, an allwhite preparatory school. “When I’m on the bench, I’m on the bench… and when I’m at
home, I’m just a father. Mark attends a private school because that’s where I think he can
get a better education, and I make no apologies for it.” While it is tough to sufficiently
assess the complete social impact of black and white leadership’s private school choices,
busing protest surely had more to do with hypocricy from urban leadership, as many of
their children never experienced public school integration.107
Judge Merhige and urban white leaders agreed on using suburbanites to achieve
their separate agendas, thus they developed Bradley by including Henrico and Chesterfield
into the suit. All things considered, the recent cross-town busing failure had less to do with
black and white leadership sending their children to private school and more to do with
municipal borders undermining Judge Merhige’s order. Judge Merhige proposed a
metropolitan consolidation back in June of 1970, given his familiarity with it in Greenville
and Brunswick Counties. In Richmond,“bus-dodging and white flight to the
suburbs…[left] consolidation as the only course for true integration.” Thinking similarly
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to Judge Merhige, the Richmond School Board and city council blamed suburbanites for
the busing disaster. “School division boundaries created and maintained by the cooperative
efforts of local and central state officials” create[d] racially identifiable schools and
Richmond’s biracial community, according to city attorneys. Richmond’s white leaders
and Judge Merhige shared a similar taste for involving suburbanites into urban politics.
While Judge Merhige cared about desegregating schools, white leadership used Bradley,
like the 1961 merger, 1964 annexation attempt, and 1969 annexation to convert
suburbanites into controllable political currency that benefited elite white control over
Richmond.108
Suburban leadership immediately recognized the quasi-partnership between
affluent whites and Judge Merhige. After Judge Merhige included both Henrico and
Chesterfield in the Bradley case, both counties filed requests for the removal of Judge
Merhige. Both county attorneys reasoned that Judge Merhige included the suburbs in
Richmond’s busing crisis because of “a personal bias or pre-justice either against”
suburban leaders. Judge Merhige’s dislike for suburbanites became clear, according to the
removal request, when he wrote: “if free citizens exercised their right to move from a
troubled community to one that offers peace, then the trouble they fled should be packed
up and sent to them.” The partnership conspiracy became apparent when Judge Merhige
wrote a letter to the Bradley attorneys “in which he suggested that it might be appropriate
for the defendant school board to discuss with the appropriate officer the contiguous
counties as to the feasibility or possibility of consolidation of school districts,” according
to Chesterfield attorneys. This letter was twofold, because it suggested Judge Merhige’s
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sympathy with urban leaders, while suggesting a partnership between the plaintiffs and
himself. Despite the evidence, the removal request was denied, forcing suburban leadership
to fight the very real Merhige-Bradley attorney coalition that appeared before their very
eyes.109
Suburban leadership’s inability to remove Judge Merhige or themselves from the
lawsuit allowed the council and Judge Merhige to use suburban resistence for political
gains. Judge Merhige approved the unitary school system in April of 1971, and on January
5, 1972, he approved an inter-jurisdictional busing plan effective for the 1972-1973
academic school year. Judge Merhige single-handedly broke “the product of private
racism” which were the municipal boundaries that allowed suburban whites to disobey his
busing order. This consolidation cemented Judge Merhige’s legacy, as Matthew Lassiter
suggested, because successfully removing Jim Crow from the Confederate capital’s school
systems made Bradley “the most important school desegregation landmark since Brown.”
Simultaneously, suburban leaders were ordered to “establish a cooperative school
operation with Richmond.” Richmond’s white leadership successfully linked the suburbs
and city through Judge Merhige’s order, as according to the ruling, Chesterfield and
Henrico leaders were required to cooperate with Richmond leadership politically, instead
of merely negotiating with them.110
The national media weighed in on Judge Merhige’s decision. U.S. World News
supported Judge Merhige’s decision. With consolidation, “there is no point of whites
moving out of the city,” said William L. Taylor Director of the Center for National Policy
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Review at Catholic University. He, along with NAACP Legal Defense Councilor Jack
Greenburg, supported Judge Merhige’s landmark decision because consolidation went “far
beyond the desegregation of a large city school system,” it established the judicial
precedent of de facto segregation being unconstitutional. To Taylor and Greenburg, the
“predominantly white school system[s] in…surrounding counties [were] the result of
discriminatory actions by both the state and local governments” of Jim Crow Virginia.
Thus, they supported Judge Merhige’s consolidation, as it was the only way to implement
Brown in the Confederate capital.111
Judge Merhige gained support from the most unlikely of Richmond residents. There
were three categories of local support for consolidation: those who believed in the vitality
of public schools, those wished to prevent white flight, and those who wished to fix
Richmond’s longstanding racial divide. Public school advocates, or the Citizens for
Exceptional Public Schools (CEPS), endorsed the “smooth transition” from separate to
unitary school districts because they believed in public education. Enemies of white flight
backed consolidation because they belived it would protect their “wonderful capital city
from becoming a ghetto city [because of] white citizens rush[ing] to the counties to avoid
desegregation.” The minority of Judge Merhige supporters saw the larger implications of
the unitary school district. Robert Benzia used his hometown of Princeton, New Jersey, to
shed light on school consolidation. “We still have our social problems” in Princeton, but it
is because of school consolidation that “people no longer think in terms of segregated
schools.” Judge Merhige’s supporters were not united on much besides the consolidation
results. Unifying the school districts kept schools open, deterred white flight, and ensured
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that racial conflict did not result in racial separation. Perhaps the disjointedness of Judge
Merhige’s supporters, as Lassiter noted, ensured that local support “struggled to gain
traction.” Nevertheless, Judge Merhige’s decision united the most unlikely of people, all
of whom felt that political consolidation was the only way to achieve their various visions
for Civil Rights Era Richmond.112
Support for consolidation did not outweigh the majority of opposition from fear.
The Citizens Against Busing (CAB), West End Concerned Parents and Friends, and the
East End PTA, openly opposed metropolitan consolidated busing. Some referred to Judge
Merhige’s ruling as communism and a violation of civil rights, while others lamented that
neighborhood schools protected their “different socioeconomic values” from the blacks
who would be bused into their neighborhood. “I’ll go to jail if I have to; I’ll move to the
Algannies if I have to; I’ll move to South Africa, I’m tired of living by minority rule,”
declaired one Chesterfield father. One Henrico mother claimed that busing enabled
“group[s] of young hoodlums… [who were] roving bands of non-students and dropouts”
from black neighborhoods to victimize white children. White opposition, regardless of
location, was very real and it prevented any legitimate chance of Judge Merhige
implementing his January ruling.113
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White opposition materialized into legal and illegal acts of resistance. Suburban
and urban white dissenters held a 108 mile motorcade, of over 4,000 people, to Washington
DC in protest of the recent federal ruling. Urban and suburban whites shouted "Save Our
Freedom” at acting Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to reverse the order of “twothirds-black city school system to merge with two largely white suburban county systems,
through more busing.” Chesterfield Board of Supervisors Irvin Horner led several rallies
in the annexed suburb under the moniker “The Peoples Revolt.” “Richmond can rot in hell”
said one Henrico resident while supporting the anti-busing rally. County residents did not
stop at civil protest. Judge Mehrige’s life was repeatedly threatened through phone calls
and residential vandalism. Threats increased so much that Judge Merhige sent his family
away while federal marshals surveillanced his home twenty four hours a day.114
Law Professor Philip B. Kurland white resentment to argue against the merits of
Judge Merhige’s consolidation in the U.S. Court of Appeals. On April 10, 1972, the United
States Court of Appeals, headed by Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., heard Chesterfield
and Henrico’s case against Judge Mehrige’s assessment that Henrico’s and Chesterfield’s
borders were “newly drawn” and “racially motivated,” creating racially segregated
schooling. Special Counselor Philip B. Kurland, who represented both Chesterfield and
Henrico Counties, argued that Judge Merhige’s ruling was a “logical fallacy,” as county
lines were established well before public schools. Despite private property owners

114

Richmond News Leader, January 19, 1972; Kook Files, University of Richmond Special Collections;
Merhige Collection Series, Box18 Folder 6, US Dist. Court, East VA (Rich) MISC School Desegregation
Interview with Professor Mary Tate, May 20, 2015; “Busing Protest,” Richmond Associated Press: Danville
Bee (February 19, 1972), James Madison University Newspaper Archives; 4; and “Anti-Busing Test First,”
Richmond Associated Press: Danville Bee (March 29, 1972), James Madison University Newspaper Archives
4A. The Judge’s dog was shot and killed. People threatened him that his son would not make it to adulthood
if he did not reverse the ruling. For more information on the severity of the death threats he received, see the
Kook Files at the University of Richmond Law Library.

96

instituting de facto segregation, the counties themselves had no racist policies limiting the
influx of black citizens. Kurland argued that Judge Merhige’s consolidation was in fact
institutionalized racism. Labeled “white supremacy in the classroom,” Kurkland
maintained that Judge Mehrige’s ruling assumed that “black children are to excel
academically” only in the presence of a white majority. Instead of attacking the overall
significance of Judge Merhige’s ruling, that being the removal of racially segregated
education through suburban-urban cooperation, Kurkland used racist notions of black
inferiority to oppose the legality of consolidation.115
The Appeals Court agreed with suburban leadership. The U.S. Court of Appeals
overturned the consolidation with a vote of five to one on June 5, 1972. According to the
court, Judge Merhige had no legal justification for “realistically plac[ing] on the counties
the responsibility for the effect that inner city decay has had on the public schools of
Richmond.” The “little action, if any, the counties may have seen to have taken to keep
blacks out,” was not enough to force them to form an unwanted union with Richmond city.
The court suggested that if Judge Merhige wanted to reverse Richmond’s long history of
segregation, he should use something other than schooling. “A school case, like a vehicle,
can carry only a limited amount of baggage,” in that there were real limits to Civil Rights
social change, and Judge Merhige’s ruling exceeded them. Using unitary schools to break
“the cycle of poverty and the policy of containing blacks within urban ghettos” would not
be done through forcing urban and suburban leadership to share similar school systems.116
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Judge Merhige and the Bradley attorneys’ last hopes for an urban/suburban unified
school system were ravished by the Supreme Court. The Bradley attorneys appealed the
Court of Appeals decision, only to have the Supreme Court not levy a ruling on the
consolidation. The four-to-four stalemate was caused by former School Board President,
Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., recusing himself from the case. Many
suggested, like Reverend Benjamin Campbell, that “it wouldn’t have mattered if he had
not excused himself.” Justice Powell, Jr.’s record as the School Board President, and his
personal racial bias, did not lead any to suggest that he would have ruled in favor of the
Bradley plaintiffs. Although the stalemate upheld the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, Bradley did not die in Richmond, it died in Detroit. Milliken v. Bradley, which
resembled Bradley v. Richmond, struck down any constitutional justification for federal
city-suburb school consolidation. Justice Powell, Jr. did not recuse himself from this case,
as he levied the deciding vote making it five-to-four against consolidation. With the
Supreme Court removing constitutional protection from Judge Merhige’s ruling,
Richmond schools continued cross-town busing, which did little more than send black
children to black schools until 1986.117
After the Supreme Court secured suburban borders from any forced political
coalition with the city, white residents and their school-aged children, poured out of
Richmond. Between 1970 and 1974, Richmond’s white school population dropped from
thirty-five percent to just twenty-five percent, reflecting a 7,782 white student decrease in
just eight semesters. The integration process black professionals started in 1960, came to
fruition by 1974; however, it did not look necessarily as they envisioned it. Although there
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were three black school board members, and by 1976 Richmond’s first black
superintendent Richard C. Hunter assumed office, the school system was devoid of any
real racial integration. From 1970 to 1986, when cross-town busing was removed,
Richmond’s white student population dwindled to just thirteen percent of the overall
population. The black middle-class effort, beginning in 1960, did not reform urban
education, as much as it forced whites to covertly seek other means of separation. While
some affluent blacks sent their children to private and suburban public schools, most had
to deal with the de facto segregated school system that Warren and both Bradley cases
created.118
Holt
The results of Curtis Holt v. City of Richmond marked the end of the Civil Rights
Era in Richmond. This seven-year case produced strange political bedfellows, who made
alliances across racial boundaries, seeking similar results for different reasons. Workingclass black leader Curtis Holt wanted to infiltrate the city council, something previously
reserved for black professionals. However, the annexation, he believed, prevented him and
other working-class leadership from winning the 1970 councilmanic election. Holt’s
attempt to infiltrate urban leadership, highlighted long-standing class issues within black
Richmond. Middle-class blacks wanted electoral support from men like Curtis Holt;
however, black professionals blocked Holt from traditional channels of political power
because he was mildly educated, he was a man of little financial means, and for some “he
wasn’t in the right church” according to author Benjamin Hill.
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Like Bradley, Holt v. City of Richmond began with Curtis Holt’s discontent over
the 1969 annexation. Most Crusade candidates had little chance at electoral success in the
1970 election. The most doubtful of the Crusade nominees was Curtis Holt. Unlike fellow
candidiate Walter T. Kenny, working-class black postal worker with middle-class and
Democratic Party ties, Curtis Holt was mildly educated, unemployed, and had few political
connections to white or black leadership. Out of all the 1970 candidates, Holt finished
seventeenth out of twenty-eight. From the perspective of black leaders, white leaders, or
annexed residents, Holt’s campaign was a failure from the beginning. His lack of formal
education showed as he often “said peoples instead of people…black leadership was
embarrassed of Holt.” Even historian John Moeser suggested that removing the 47,000
annexed white votes, all eight of the additional candidates, and distributing the remaining
votes among the twenty one remaining candidates, “it is highly doubtful that Holt would
have been among the top nine candidates.” However, Curtis Holt believed the 1969
annexation ruined his councilmanic bid, thus he attacked it in court.119
Curtis Holt’s ability to serve both working and middle-class black agendas began
his political ascendancy. Despite low economic and educational status, Holt was a conduit
between black leadership and their working-class voters. After a construction accident
rendered him permanently disabled, Holt became a resident of the Creighton Court
Housing Projects in the 1950s. After his accident, Holt entered politics by gaining the trust
of both black middle and working classes. For working-class blacks, Holt appeared as the
man of the people. After the city council refused to put a traffic light in front of Creighton
Court Housing Projects, on Nine Mile Road, Curtis Holt spent every weekday afternoon
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directing traffic so black children could safely get off the school bus. Holt used his display
of communal leadership to unite working-class blacks into the Grassroots Coalition. In this
coalition, Holt helped register East End black voters for the Crusade to use throughout the
1960s. In one election, his organization helped register over 3,000 voters alone. Holt’s
community efforts, and mobilization tactics, made him an important man in the black
community by 1970.120
The class differences illuminated by the 1969 annexation, forced Holt to split from
black leaders. Holt wished to sue the city council immediately following the 1970 council
election however, the local NAACP refused to take up his case. “They gave me the
runaround…they’re all so busy…some didn’t even return my phone calls,” said Holt. This
only affirmed his and other blacks’ suspicions that “the power structure is only using
middle-class blacks to continue to isolate the grassroots blacks in order to keep the city
running in the hands of the power structure.” Holt’s opposition to annexation brought out
the class disparities that the Crusade was able to bypass in the mid-1960s. Moreover,
working-class blacks supported Holt, as the lawsuit separated him from Crusade
leadership. “What I can’t understand is what makes a black politician think that once he is
elected to office, all he has to do is just sit back and wait until his people elect him again
and again,” argued one Holt supporter. She highlighted how opposition to annexation made
black class relations complex because “some of them [middle-class blacks], a poor black
person cannot even present a problem to, because if they have ever had their problem they
don’t have it now.” Because Holt refused to drop his case against the city, for what he felt
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was an illegal annexation, he and black leadership grew apart. This alianed Holt from the
same black leadership he helped gain power throughout the 1960s.121
Holt’s split from Crusade leadership exposed deeper divides in Richmond’s black
community. Richmond’s black community often “imitated white class divisions, but with
“greater anxiety,” according to author Benjamin Hill. Richmond, more than any other city
in Virginia, had rigid class systems. Poor and middle-class whites in Richmond’s Southside
and wealthy West End whites had little to nothing in common, other than being white.
Richmond’s black community had class issues however, Jim Crow Era racism united them
because middle-class blacks lived amongst their working-class counterparts. As Jim Crow
fell, through voting rights and school desegregation, class disparity became more visible.
Black professionals were able to buy homes during urban redevelopment, whereas poor
blacks could not. Middle-class blacks attended white public and private schools, whereas
working-class black children did not. As the black middle-class gained urban leadership
positions, such as Urban League President, City Councilman, Housing Committee
Member, Vice Mayor, and State Senator, its racial connection to the working-class became
weaker and more vulnerable to class division.122
Rejection from black leadership, forced working-class leader Curtis Holt to align
with annexed whites. In late 1970, Curtis Holt brought his case to Cabell Venable. The
young white lawyer, who successfully defended the KKK just a few months prior, agreed
to take the case to trial because this landmark case could, and ultimately did, propel his
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legal career. Both Holt and annexed suburbanites shared similar interests. While Holt saw
de-annexation as the means to acquire a city council seat, annexed residents saw deannexation as the means to return to Chesterfield. Because helping Holt could ultimately
bring about a mutually beneficial result, suburban neighborhood organizations paid Holt’s
legal fees. “We recognize the expense of litigation and are prepared to underwrite the
cost…stating on behalf of the Councils, we want de-annexation,” declaired Arthur R.
Cloey, head of two South Richmond suburban civic associations. Cabell and the suburban
patrons supporting Holt’s case represented a political union between annexed whites and
the black working-class leader. It was this strange partnership that fought tooth and nail to
reverse the 1969 annexation.123
Curtis Holt used Civil Rights legislation as a tool against the city council’s
annexation. On February 24, 1971, Curtis Holt sued Richmond City in federal court over
the 1969 annexation. Using Perkins v. Matthews as a precedent, Holt’s attorney requested
the annulment of the 1969 annexation, an immediate election following the ruling, and the
removal of Richmond’s right to annex. To Holt, the annexation’s influx of 47,000 white
voters violated his Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendment rights protected under Section I of
both amendments. Holt’s use of recent Civil Rights legislation illuminated his vision for
post-Jim Crow Richmond. To Holt, post-Jim Crow Richmond was to have a black majority
with working-class leadership within the council. No longer was power to be held by
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affluent whites or black professional leadership. Rather, men such as he should assume
leadership in a majority black city.124
Holt’s case brought about a complex hybrid legal battle within two different
locations. Because Holt included possible civil rights violations, the annexation was
discussed on two fronts. In Washington, DC, the United States District Court of the District
of Columbia was given the authority, under the VRA, to federally approve any annexation
that placed the previous racial voting majority into the voting minority. Because the city
council never submitted the annexation to the Washington Court for federal approval, the
Justice Department, headed by Acting Assistant Attorney General David L. Normal, was
charged with investigating the annexation and rendering its opinion to the Washington
court. In Richmond, Judge Robert Merhige headed the Holt case. Judge Merhige was to
rule on Holt based on the federal approval or disapproval of the 1969 annexation. Although
Holt’s case was being argued in Richmond, the Justice Department’s assessment, and the
Washington court’s annexation decision, determined whether Curtis Holt won or lost his
class-action suit.125
The Justice Department’s initial reaction to the annexation empowered Curtis
Holt’s case against the city. On May 7, 1971, Assistant U.S. Attorney General David L.
Norman objected to the 1969 annexation because the city council neglected to seek federal
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approval in 1969. Despite City Attorney Conrad B. Maddox Jr. requesting federal approval
for the annexation based on its economic benefits, Holt’s attorney and annexed leaders
Ronald Livingston and Roger Griffin argued that the annexation was used by the city
council to disenfranchise urban blacks. Norman’s disapproval should have come as no
surprise, given that Norman, unlike most President Richard Nixon supporters, was known
for his sympathies for Civil Rights violations. This initial decision changed the game in
Richmond. Holt’s case like his 1970 councilmanic candidacy, was seen originally as a
failure waiting to happen. However, Norman’s federal objection to the annexation breathed
life into Holt’s case, because federal disapproval could have led to Judge Merhige ruling
in Curtis Holt’s favor.126
Both the Justice Department and Judge Robert Merhige aided black and white
leadership interest by refusing to de-annex the suburbs. After the city council voted sevento-two on implementing ward-style voting, the Justice Department found “no basis for
withdrawing” their original objection. However, the annexation objection focused on
voting, in that the new ward plans did not negate the obvious voting change the 1969
annexation caused. Norman’s second objection did not mean the Washington Court would
de-annex South Richmond, because Norman and the Washington Court favored
“nonracially drawn councilmanic districts” not de-annexation. Similarly, on November 23,
1971, Judge Merhige ruled in favor of Holt by acknowledging the annexation violated his
Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendment rights. However, Judge Merhige, like Norman,
refused to de-annex South Richmond. Both Curtis Holt and city officials received half of
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what they wanted. Curtis Holt’s attorney proved city officials used their authority to strip
working-class blacks of their civil rights as city officials kept annexed territories.127
The U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia’s ruling on Petersburg,
Virginia’s, annexation case foreshadowed its decision on Richmond. On October 18, 1972,
the Washington Court approved Petersburg City’s annexation of Prince George County if
“a ward system of electing its city councilmen” was implemented to reverse the new white
majority from diluting the previous black majority vote. Like Richmond, Petersburg’s
white leadership annexed a small portion of Prince George County, bringing in over nine
thousand white voters to dilute the black vote from fifty-six percent to forty-seven percent.
This ruling set the precedent for Richmond’s city council, as the Washington Court made
it clear that Richmond’s annexation, for that matter any race-based annexation could stand
if the voting style was changed. As Richmond’s case was moved up the docket, City
Attorney Conrad Mattox and Holt Attorney Cabell Venable, as well as suburban leader
Melvin Burnett understood that the continuous refusal to de-annex meant the annexation
was more than likely going to stand.128
Seeing Petersburg’s case as the example, Curtis Holt and his attorney believed city
official’s proactive voting changes hurt the possibility for de-annexation. After much

Richmond News Leader, July 9, 1971; and Bart Barnes, “David L. Norman Dies at 70,” February 8, 1995.
Apart of Judge Merhige’s ruling was that the city council host special elections in January of 1972, however
that portion of the ruling was appealed by city officials and upheld by the appeals court and the Supreme
Court in December on December 6, 1971. Both Holt and the city council appealed Judge Merhige’s decision
in the court of appeals, which deadlocked the Holt case. Curtis Holt appealed the refusal to de-annex based
upon the annexation violating civil rights, and city officials appealed Judge Merhige’s findings that the
annexation was racially motivated, which could have allowed the Washington court to de-annex South
Richmond. Also, city council elections were suspended by the Supreme Court until Holt and the annexation
case was officially resolved. Therefore, the 1970 council remained in office until 1977. For more information,
see Holt v. City of Richmond, 877.
128
Richmond Times Dispatch, September 29, 1971; Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 23, 1971; and City
of Petersburg v. United States. 345 F. Supp. 1344 1021 (1972).
127

106

infighting about the minutia of the ward proposals, on August 25, 1973, the city council,
with Justice Department and Washington Court’s Chief Justice Skelly Wright’s approval,
changed to ward-style voting. Richmond was divided into nine wards: four black wards
(East End and Northside), four white wards (West End and Southside), and one swing vote
or mixed ward (core). Holt and annexed residents lividly rejected the voting change as they
believed the council was “us[ing] blacks as absolute fools.” Changing the voting strategy
put city official’s one step closer to receiving federal approval on annexation. Rather,
Curtis Holt and his attorney called for “black-white cooperation in the de-annexation case”
because the “the voting rights of black citizens” were only restored if they were the city’s
majority. Despite Holt and Venable’s opposition, the measure was passed and helped signal
the end of Holt’s case against the city.129
Despite the short gains made by the city council, Holt and the annexation wore
down Richmond’s white leadership. After U.S. Magistrate Lawrence Margolis
recommended the Washington and Richmond Court’s de-annex the suburbs, the
Washington court issued a “no decision” on the annexation’s constitutionality, and Holt’s
attorney filed two subsequent lawsuits against the city in the local court; three city
councilmen resigned. The three exiting councilmen, William Daniel, Howard Carwile, and
James Carpenter, all felt the city’s legal troubles were too much to handle, while running
their own day-to-day affairs. Many believed that if the six remaining councilmen selected
Curtis Holt, the city’s legal issues would end. Despite strong evidence supporting this
suggestion, not one councilman placed his name into consideration. Instead, they chose
two Team of Progress (TOP) supporters, Julius Johnson and Raymond Royall, along with
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Crusade supporter Willie Dell. This move reflected the collective efforts of middle-class
black and white elites to oppose Holt and his suburban patrons.130
With the resignation of three councilmen, white leadership began a series of
strategies preparing Richmond for its impending black leadership. The end was so close
“they could smell it,” as white leaders systematically removed themselves and their
business interest to the suburbs. First, the council allowed Amtrak to move to Henrico
County. Although “federal legislation said it had to stay in town,” the council allowed
Amtrak to build a suburban station on Staples Mill Road, signaling its transition to the
suburbs. This removed income from city coffers. The city council set up the Marymount
Park Foundation to allocate tax revenue to pay for its upkeep because they felt whenever
“the black folks took over, they wouldn’t know how to take care of it.” The white council,
through the Downtown Development Unlimited, set up a “bond reserve fund of about nine
million a year out of its operating budget” to pay the city’s bond holders for infrastructural
upkeep. White councilmen approved the creation of magnet schools that worked with
Virginia Commonwealth University, University of Richmond, and Virginia Union
University, to stimulate Richmond’s failing public education system. These measures were
only a few in a series of ventures taken by white leadership to prepare the city for life
without them.131
In the midst of white leadership’s transition out of the city, the Washington Court
affirmed the legitimacy of the annexation. After the Supreme Court heard and ruled in
favor of City Attorney Mattox’s appeal to Margolis’s de-annexation recommendation, in

130

Richmond Times-Dispatch February 4, 1974; Richmond News Leader, February 4, 1974; and City of
Richmond v. United States, United States District Court of District of Columbia.
131
Pratt, Color of Their Skin, 94; and Interview with Benjamin Campbell, January 6, 2016.

108

October of 1975, the Washington Court allowed city officials to retain the annexation if
they could show “verifiable economic or administrative benefits” from the acquisition. City
officials argued that Holt’s solution would financially bankrupt the city. De-annexation
meant “rendering Richmond a vast ghetto…giving up $435 million worth of taxable
property.” Likewise, the Crusade submitted an editorial to convince black residents that
de-annexation only benefitted “white citizens in the annexed area…If black voters can
obtain significant power in an expanded city, they will be able to direct city government so
as to benefit both blacks and whites,” removing the financial troubles “within its old
boundaries.” Holt’s attorney addressed the black and white elite partnership in the
Washington Court. Cabell noted that urban blacks felt the financial burden of allocating
public services to the suburbs. Venable also used race to argue that annexation support was
“merely a second line defense of white supremacy and a first line defense of personally
motivated black political bosses who insulate themselves in pocket boroughs.” Venable
reasoned that the annexation was nothing more than black and white elites trying to prevent
working-class “men like Curtis Holt from obtaining office.” Venable’s class and racecentered argument against the annexation failed, as the federal court approved the
annexation on August 9, 1976.132
The federal ruling solidified black and white urban leadership political victory over
Holt and the annexed suburbanites. Despite Venable’s objection to the federal court ruling,
the annexation was rock solid by August 9, 1976. The publicity of Holt’s class-action suit
was not enough to reverse the secret deal made by Phil Bagley and Irvin Horner in May of
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1969. Curtis Holt and the annexed residents’ Civil Rights Era political coalition ended in
defeat. Both agendas aligned on de-annexation and both agendas died on de-annexation.
Despite the new ward system and notoriety he gained from opposing urban leadership, Holt
never became a city councilman. Although annexed residents went as far as not paying
local taxes during the trials, their residency remained within city limits.133
Coming off of the Holt trials, Richmond was ripe for a racial shift in the city
council. The first phase of Richmond’s post-Holt black political takeover was done through
education. In 1976, Richard C. Hunter became Richmond’s first black school
superintendent. With the 1977 election season heating up in December of 1976, it was a
forgone conclusion that at least four blacks were winning council seats. The Justice
Department forced the white city council to change from at-large to ward-style voting.
Because blacks were the voting majority prior to the 1969 annexation, the new ward system
placed more voting wards in black dominated districts. Four of the new nine districts were
majority black, while one the swing district was over fifty percent black as well. After the
Justice Department removed the ban on citywide elections on March 1, 1977, seven days
later, Richmond elected its first majority black city council consisting of Crusade endorsees
Henry Marsh III, Walter T. Kenney, Claudette McDaniel, Willie J. Dell, and “Bad Luck”
Henry (Chuck) Richardson. The majority black council’s first action, signaling the racial
shift the city and its council experienced in the last seventeen years, was their election of
Henry Marsh III as Richmond’s first black mayor.
Conclusion
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The 1969 annexation, along with Bradley and Holt, simultaneously created political
partnerships that would have never been dreamed of before 1970. While urban white
officials worked with Bradley attorneys to desegregate city schools, annexed suburbanites
and working-class blacks partnered in their objection to integrated schools. Likewise, black
and white leadership collectively opposed Curtis Holt’s bid for urban power, while
suburbanites, with attorney Cabell Venable, financially supported Holt’s political agenda
to get their neighborhoods de-annexed from the city. The annexation, which tied both
Bradley and Holt together, illuminated why race alone cannot explain Civil Rights Era
Richmond. Complex political battles, secret dealings, and class-centered interest all
influenced constituencies within both races to make allies where they could to achieve their
desired result. A man like Curtis Holt, who was “shrewd and intelligent” was little more
than an “embarrassment” to black leadership, yet he gained political support for his case
across racial lines. White leadership, who wanted to maintain power over Richmond,
aligned with black leaders, whom the opposed in urban elections, when challenged by their
suburban neighbors. Race can not alone explain Richmond’s Civil Rights Era urban
politics.
The truth is race, class, and geography culminated to create this complex Civil
Rights Era drama. The use of race, class, and geography as political currency had limits
however understanding how those limits intersect to create uncommon alliances, dictated
the framework for understanding Civil Rights Era Richmond. Furthermore, as school
desegregation and urban politics created Richmond’s black identity, the complex,
agonizing, and controversial issues raised in the process will forever be the legacy left by
Richmond’s Civil Rights Era.
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Epilogue: Post-Civil Rights Richmond
In the first two weeks after the 1977 councilmanic election, Marsh redefined the
office of mayor. Marsh wanted to be the face of the city, rather than the figurehead elected
by his friends on the city council. To establish his mayoral presence, Marsh removed the
white city manager and replaced him with lesser known black bureaucrat Manual Deese.
Before the 1977 election, the white majority council selected William J. Leidinger as city
manager, hoping he would maintain affluent white business interest in City Hall. Marsh’s
first course of action was requesting that City Manager Leidinger resign immediately. After
the Richmond Business Community threatened to pull its support from Marsh, he and the
four black councilmen all voted to remove Leidinger from office. This move by Marsh not
only, as Moeser suggested, cemented the councilmanic power shift, it created a whole new
battle between black councilmanic leadership and white business interest, a battle that
black leaders ultimately lost.134
The 1980s: Richmond Goes Broke
First on council’s agenda was rebuilding Richmond’s economy. After the council
removed Leidinger from his duties, the five black councilmen focused on easing white
anxiety over the power shift. Henry Marsh III, like other black councilmen, received
numerous death threats to his office and home. White hostility to the black council made
every day “a battle” that was “just downright cut-throat.” The best way to ease white
discontent was through redevelopment, something white residents and leadership favored
throughout the 1960s and 70s. This redevelopment, however, included a revival of large
retail stores in the downtown shopping district. The idea depended on large local retail
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chains, Thalhimer’s and Miller & Rhodes, to anchor retail flight back to downtown
Richmond. This plan, called Project One, was approved by the black majority council and
former mayor Thomas Bliley, who represented what was left of Richmond’s white business
leaders.135
The black council’s economic redevelopment strategy failed. Although Phillip
Morris, the city’s largest private sector employer, created 1,800 new jobs by 1980, many
white business leaders refused to work with the black council. In 1981, the Hilton
Corporation announced its plans to build a new hotel in the same business zone as Project
One. If the hotel was built, it spelled the end of Project One’s biggest projected
moneymakers, the hotel. To thwart The Hilton Corporation’s clear attempt to derail the
black council’s version of urban redevelopment, the council developed and “passed a
specific ordinance” preventing Hilton’s hotel construction. Eventually, the city council was
sued and settled out of court, allowing Hilton to build its hotel. This move created a storm
that the council could not control. Not only did it expose how the black council would use
its power to achieve a self-serving end, it reminded residents that blacks controlled the
council, but whites controlled the economic fate of the city.136
The Hilton controversy highlighted the rivalry between black and white leaders.
Despite Justin Moore, head of Richmond’s only electric company (VEPCO) helping to
fund the Sixth Street Marketplace in 1985, affluent white leaders relocated their businesses
to the suburbs. Men like Miller & Rhoads Department Store owner Thomas P. Bryan Jr.,
Universal Leaf Tobacco president Howard Cone, and head of First and Merchants National
Bank Bruce Nolte all moved their business interests into Henrico and Chesterfield or sold
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their businesses on the open market. In the midst of relocating, all of the men, with former
City Manager William Leidinger, fought every zoning proposal and land deal with Henrico
and Chesterfield Marsh and fellow council members suggested. While it appeared as
political strife between former and new urban leadership, it is clear that post-Civil Rights
Era political strife brought out Jim Crow Era racial tensions. Oliver Hill, former black city
councilmen, suggested that “the real issue” was that “the Richmond newspapers and white
citizens generally,” have “unending resistance” to the reality of Richmond’s black
controlled city council.137
Race and space defined Richmond’s black leaders’ poor working relationship with
suburban leaders. Just as affluent whites battled with suburban leaders in the 1960s and
1970s, post-Civil Rights Era black leaders fell victim to the same city-county political
dichotomy. In the 1980s, suburbia attracted yet another constituency away from the city’s
tax base: the black middle-class. Racial and class unity had limits, as middle-class blacks
fled the city in search of the same suburban class-centred suburban lifestyle the silent
majority chased throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As the urban housing market sunk and
city schools became more impoverished, black porfesionals it “became about where you
can buy a house or what school district you could afford to live in,” according to author
Benjamin Campbell. It became clear that the black middle-class exacerbated its economic,
political, and social potential in Richmond. As Chesterfield and Henrico gained a stronge
black tax base, both leaderships refused to work with urban leadership on cooperative
public projects like rebuilding schools, shared roads, maintaining public parks, and creating
consolidated prison systems. In all, the urban-suburban political strife only intensified
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when black leadership assumed the city council, as suburban economic power incentivized
its leaders to not cooperate with black city officials.138
State and federal powers ensured Richmond remained poverty-stricken under black
leadership. By 1985, annexation laws, business relocation, and middle-class (black and
white) flight depleted city coffers. City debt tripled that of Chesterfield and Henrico, as
both counties were in their second stage of deindustrialized economic growth. Decreased
revenue prevented city councilmen from obtaining bonding capacity to rebuild dated
infrastructure and maintain municipal jobs. Although the city had a bond reserve fund of
about nine million dollars, it was not enough to take out new loans and pay bondholders
from the 1969 annexation, redevelopment projects from the mid-1960s, and the Sixth Street
Marketplace in 1985. After the General Assembly refused to help, City Manager Manual
Deese secured private funding for new bonding capacity however, bondholders only
released funds to pay the city’s previous bond holders. This created a cycle of long-term
debt, preventing any chance of economic stability. Adding insult to injury, the General
Assembly and the Federal Highway Administration co-funded circumvential highways
around Richmond. These highways, I-295 and Virginia State Route 288 cost over 1.1
billion dollars and eliminated “the center city as a necessity” for suburbanites and corporate
business interest. As state and federal powers hindered Richmond’s economic
development, the city fell deeper into economic poverty.139
The 1990s: Drugs and City Hall
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Throughout the 1990s, political corruption became the hallmark of Richmond’s city
council. Henry (Chuck) Richardson, resigned in 1995 after being convicted of running an
elaborate heroin operation out of the city council. Although Richardson fancied himself a
“public relations consultant and real estate agent,” FBI investigations proved he was a
lifelong heroin dealer and user who became a prominent member Richmond’s black elite
without having a legal occupation. Richardson used his council seat to give municipal
contracts to fellow drug dealers who laundered money through legitimate businesses. What
made this resignation peculiar was the support Richardson received from the same
community who knew of his illegal activities. Not only was Richardson a known heroin
dealer, he was reelected four times after having “annual brushes with the law” over cocaine,
heroin, and drunken driving charges. “He was our Robin Hood…they won’t let a good man
serve us” said thirty-year-old single mother Karen Williams who, like many black
Richmonders, saw Richardson as a man of the people, rather than the urban slum lord the
1960s white media predicted would come to fruition with black leadership. Despite
publicly swearing off drugs, after a 1988 cocaine incident landed him in drug rehab,
Richardson landed back in jail several times, all while having the longest tenure on the
council by 1996.140
Richardson’s reputation and antics only tarnished the legacy of the 1977 power
shift. Throughout the 1990s, Councilman Richardson earned the name “Bad Luck Chuck,”
as his run-ins with law enforcement placed a negative image upon himself and the black
city council. Richardson’s last straw came on April 8, 2004, when police sergeant Anthony
Franklin uncovered a marijuana lab, crack cocaine, and boxes of syringes at Richardson’s

140

“Richmond Official Quits After Drug Charges,” New York Times, September 19, 1995.

116

home during a drug sweep. Although Richardson was acquitted because his son, Karl
Richardson, confessed to running the marijuana and crack cocaine business, Chuck’s
checkered past suggest he was always the brains of the operation. Chuck’s life was defined
by drugs. Whether selling or using, Chuck was known throughout the city for his leadership
over Richmond’s criminal underworld. As the council’s influence spiraled into obscurity,
Chuck Richardson’s reputation became the symbol of corruption under which the black
city council was remembered.141
Many believed that Chuck Richardson’s demise, along with the image of black
councilmanic leaderships, was no coincidence. Men like Henry Marsh, Howard Carwile,
James Carpenter, and Walter T. Kenny, all left urban politics for state politics, national
politics, or retirement by 1992. Although these men were remembered as Civil Rights Era
leaders, they relied on men like Chuck Richardson to mobilize the working-class black
voters that the black intelligencia lost touch with. As Civil Rights Era leaders transcended
urban politics, some believe Richardson became expendable. Urban blacks believe
Chuck’s misfortune was “revenge by the establishment” who had no use for a man with
his checkered past. White and black leaders knew who Chuck was before his 1980s and
1990s legal troubles, however, it was not until after his allies left city politics did he become
a constant target by police. This could be speculation, yet the mood amongst thirty-to-sixtyyear-old blacks who remember Chuck is that he “stepped into a trap” once black politicians
did not need neighborhood crime bosses to mobilize black voters anymore.142
The 2000s: Public School Failure
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The early 2000s were defined by economic and racial re-segregation impacting
public education. Public schools reflected how economic flight, black middle-class flight,
and non-cooperation from surrounding counties impacted Richmond. After 1986, the city
council removed cross-town busing and implemented school zones. This allowed West End
whites to attend public school without fearing black influx. To keep the brightest black
pupils from attending private schools, the council invested in charter schools, such as Open
High School, Richmond Community, and Franklin Military Academy. Although these
helped retain the brightest of the plus eighty-five percent black public school population,
by 2010, state financial aid decreased due to low state test scores labeling Richmond
schools as “failing” institutions not worth investment. This resonated in Governor Robert
McDonell 2011 removal of more than 5 million dollars from the city’s public school
budget, making Richmond 10% of the state’s public education budget cut.143
Today: My Experiences
Just as Virginia Union University (VUU) inspired Richmond white-to-black
transition in the 1960s, Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) is the backbone of
black-to-white gentrification. In the 1960s, VUU affiliates like Dr. William Thornton,
Raymond Hilton, and Henry Marsh inspired the social unrest leading to Richmond’s black
powershift. Today, VCU is undoing the Civil Rights Era racial transition through structural
gentrification. As new libraries, educational buildings, condos, downtown businesses,
athletic centers, and shopping malls are replacing old black business and residential
districts. This gentrification is increasing Richmond’s white population. As of 2014, whites
made up 44% of city residents. This rise from below 15% in the 90s came undoubtedly
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from increased VCU enrollment and the capital investment VCU expansion inspired. Once
the hotbed for white flight, Richmond is becoming one of the most sought after residential
and business destinations for whites in the metropolitan area.144
Growing up in the Richmond metropolitan area gave me a nuanced understanding
of the racial system the transition created. Richmond’s racism is structural: with education
and economics ensuring blacks have limited access to upward social mobility. While
structural and systematic, race has its limits. Middle and upper-class black Richmonders
survive structural racism by understanding and navigating around the racially coded
barriers that blur the sources of black poverty. For example, high test scores in all-black
public schools, or attending majority white private schools gives blacks access to
universities, connections, job skills, and occupations that are not otherwise available.
Blacks who access these tools understand that working with whites is the only way to
convert their skills into wealth. Black business owners run their day-to-day affairs in black
neighborhoods, yet the majority live in white suburbs and send their children to white
private or public schools. The black community cannot create its own collective wealth
because their middle-class professionals nor municipal government will invest into them
as a whole. Rather, whoever can ascend from poverty, usually does so at the expense of
the blacks surrounding them.
Race is more of an issue now than it has ever been in the metropolitan area because
it highlights insecurities over the results of the Civil Rights Era. Race in the metropolitian
area cannot be addressed by either blacks or whites because racial discrimination was never
resolved by Jim Crows’ demise. Despite VCU, the Virginia Historical Society, and the
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University of Richmond (UR) numerous efforts to make race a part of the metropolitan
history, most whites rather not discuss the topic. Parents of West End Richmond’s Glenn
Allen High School complained that lessons about race are nothing more than using “white
guilt” as a divisive topic. Race can only be divisive if it illuminates an active problem, yet
this is accepted by white residents. Matthew Lassiter’s assessment of white collar racial
innocence and suburban exclusion from race issues still exist today in the metropolitan
area. It is difficult for whites to accept that their middle and upper-class lives exist at the
expense of the blacks who were economically trapped in a decrepit inner-city just over fifty
years ago.145
In all, the Civil Rights Era hindered Richmond’s social growth. With Civil Rights
legislation, Richmond had the potential to send shockwaves throughout the nation by being
the first southern city to remove racial discrimination and discourse. The only way for the
post-racial society to exist was through blacks and whites refusing to use race in the
political, economic, educational, and social arena. Instead, both blacks and whites used
race to obtain political power in the post-Jim Crow world. My own family refuse to let go
of race when they were some of the middle-class blacks to flee to Chesterfield after the
1977 election. Why didn’t the Civil Rights Era produce a racially blind Richmond?
Because blacks and whites retained Jim Crow Era racial norms where the Civil Rights
movement was felt the most. This created one of the most racially charged times in city
history, as economics, education, and politics all centered on racial uncertainty.
Nevertheless, blacks gained municipal control in Richmond, but it drove racial fears and
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uncertainty past the point of reconciliation. This is why the Civil Rights Era failed to bring
about a post-racial society in Richmond, Virginia.
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